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A Study of the Partition of Palestine

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A STUDY OF THE PARTITION OF PALESTINE

- 1947 -


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
Nicola Youssef Sharaiha

A Thesis presented to the General Faculty of
The Claremont Graduate School in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Master of Arts

We certify that we have read this thesis
and approve it as adequate in scope and
quality for the degree of Master of Arts:


Thesis Examiner


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Date July 30, 1947

PREFACE

The United Nations Special Committee on Palestine is now a past history, along with the seventeen previous Committees and commissions which had reported on the Palestine problem.

But this Committee had several unusual features. It was a United Nations Committee and the Big Powers had no part in it. It was instructed to complete its work in one hundred and twenty days. The Committee visited four continents, heard many advocates and collected nearly two hundred pounds of typed or printed evidence. Lastly it was the first international Committee to study the problem of Jewry inside and outside Palestine.

I was in Palestine during the Committee's hearing in Jerusalem in 1947 and I was in the United States when the United Nations, under Pressure of Politics, voted for the Committee's decision - the partition of Palestine. Since then, it was my privilege to give a first hand account of the Arab-Jewish conflict by all that I saw, read and heard. I thought it might be useful to share with others the political education which it was my privilege to obtain in my own country.

I was surprised and irritated, in New York as well as in California, by the almost complete disregard and ignorance

of the Palestine problem and particularly the Arab case. Only those few Americans who had actual experience of the Middle East showed any real understanding of the problem. It is this ignorance, indeed, on the part of the American intelligentsia that led me to write this narrative. If it does nothing else, I hope that it indicates the irresponsibility of those who find it easy to make up their minds far away from the scene of action; and secondly, the need, on the part of British and American statesmen, for imagination and understanding strong enough to see through official papers the human problems which they too often conceal.

Through my research I have found that there is in existence already a considerable body of literature in English and other European languages on the history of the British mandate and the work of the United Nations' Special Committee on Palestine. But it has to be used with care, partly because of the high percentage of open or veiled propaganda, and partly because the remoteness of the indispensable Arabic sources has militated against real fairness, even in the works of neutral and fair minded historians. Zionist propaganda is active, highly organized and wide-spread; the world press, at any rate in the democracies of the West, is largely amenable to it; it commands many of the available channels for the dissemination of news, and more particularly those of the English speaking world. Arab propaganda is in comparison primitive and infinitely less successful; the Arabs

have little of the skill and financial resources which make Jewish propaganda so effective.

Another vast body of information comes from official British sources, but here, too, the requirements of true impartiality are not met. Nor can they be, until the time comes when the British Government can release more documents for publication.

The members of the United Nations' Special Committee on Palestine enjoy the benefits of a well-equipped Zionist office in Geneva, which supplies them with information in a form and a language suited to their comprehension. There is no similar channel on the Arab side. Even such sources as the Arabic Press of Palestine, which provides a valuable body of comment on the operation of the mandate as it affects the Arab population, are not used. Petitions and memoranda drawn up in Arabic have to be submitted at Geneva in translation. It requires more than mere transposition to turn good Arabic into readable English or French, and the Arabs of Palestine are unskilled in the art of presenting their case in a foreign language. The result is that the knowledge possessed by the members of the Committee is visibly one-sided and their examination of the working of the mandate reads as though it was conducted for the most part by advocates of the Zionist case.

The writer, as a native of that troubled part of the world and as a student of international relations, believes

that the study of the Palestine partition is beset with peculiar difficulties. In the first place, the material is enormous and widely scattered. In the second place, it is to an unusual degree conflicting and inconsistent. Thirdly, a large proportion of it which on inspection appears relevant and promising turns out, when sifted, to rest upon false assumptions or questionable data. Lastly, the passions aroused by Palestine have done so much to obscure the truth that the facts have become enveloped in a mist of sentiment, legend and propaganda, which acts as a smoke-screen of almost impenetrable density.

I do not claim that the present study has necessarily mastered all those difficulties. But I have been made acutely aware of their existence by my research, and they have led me to the conclusion that the most formidable obstacle to an understanding, and therefore to a solution, of the Palestine problem lies not so much in its inherent complexity as in the solid jungle of legend and propaganda which has grown up around it. To the ordinary tasks of a student dealing with the facts is thus added an obligation to deal with the pseudo-facts and dethrone them from their illegitimate eminence. It is as much his duty to expose the fallacies as to assert the truth, and the duty is all the more imperative as he is dealing with a tragedy, in which innocent lives are being sacrificed every day and human beings kept in anguish and suffering.

To discharge my responsibility properly and faithfully, I have presented this paper to the reader in a well rounded and balanced shape, starting with a short introduction as an essential background to my theme. The purpose of this introduction is to orient the reader as to the nature, origin and the development of the Palestine question. This part shall be called Palestine and Power of Politics.

Part two is the main theme of this paper. The United Nations and the Partition of Palestine -- mainly the work of the United Nations' Special Committee on Palestine which offers the students of international relations a good lesson in pressure of politics.

The first three chapters of this part deal with the origin, composition, term of references, chairmanship, working committees and the decision of the jury (United Nations' Special Committee on Palestine).

Chapter four is viewpoints, comments and attitudes of the members of the committees and the parties involved. It is a critical evaluation of the United Nations' Special Committee on Palestine's decision.

Chapter five is the considerations and observations. It is another critical evaluation of the Committee's partition-plan in the light of -- Israel-- in the pattern of the Middle East.

Chapter six is the conclusion in which I will elaborate

the rebirth of Israel and the shifting of balance of power in the Middle East as a result of the attitude of the big powers who supported the Committee's partition-plan in the United Nations' final decision.

Whatever the Committee's merits and shortcomings, the present Israel State is a growing concern. The relations between Israel and the Arab countries appear to be characterized by a "bad neighbor policy." Whether the Arabs will admit the de facto existence of Israel and come to settlement remains to be seen. But time favors Israel, and the longer it maintains itself the more difficult it will become for the Arabs to ignore its existence.

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"The present problem of Palestine, indeed is unintelligible without a knowledge of the history that lies behind it. .

No other problem of our times is rooted so deeply in the past."

Palestine Royal Commission Report,
1937

INTRODUCTION

PART I

PALESTINE AND POWER POLITICS

(THE ORIGIN AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROBLEM)

CHAPTER I

Palestine and the Great Powers

Geographically Palestine is the heart of one of the most important zones of political conflict in the world-- the Near East. The Arab-Jewish question in Palestine cannot be considered in a vacuum. It is surrounded by many political forces that must be taken into account in attempting any solution of the problem. These forces are the old familiar ones -- imperialism, world politics and nationalism. In the Near Eastern area British, Russian, American, Jewish and Arab-Moslem interests meet. As the most troublesome spot of the area, Palestine is inevitably involved in any settlement affecting the Near East.

Great Britain and Palesinte

As a world power and empire, Great Britain has been vitally concerned in the Near and Middle East. The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 was one of the prominent links of the chain binding England to the Near East. All along the Mediterranean-Suez -- Red Sea route to India and the Far East, England has built and maintained security outposts -- Malta, Cyprus, Egypt, and Aden are prominent examples. That vital

Near Eastern zone she is endeavoring to protect from the many forces that are today challenging her predominant position there.

The Near East is strategically located on other communications systems besides the Suez Canal route. Dry land routes connecting Europe, Asia and Africa traverse this area. Russia has historically tried to open windows to the Indian Ocean or the Mediterranean through the Near Eastern wall. Whether she will be successful in the future remains to be seen. During and since the recent war, air bases in the Near East have become of increasing importance to both Great Britain and the United States. Furthermore, the Near East is rich in natural resources -- Egyptian cotton, Palestinian minerals from the Dead Sea, and petroleum. Finally, this area may become in the future an important market.

Great Britain, although facing many demands from a rising Arab nationalism in recent years, still retains influence in practically every state in the Near East. Besides being the mandatory power in Palestine, she maintains a very special position in independent Egypt where, under treaty, she has maintained troops since the nineteenth century. She is negotiating at present time to withdraw from Egypt and for that reason she is all the more reluctant to surrender her other positions in the Near East. Iraq and the recently created independent Kingdom of Trans-Jordan

are in special treaty relations with Great Britain which permit the latter to maintain armed forces in these two countries. King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia receives a subsidy from the British government. British oil interests dominate southern Iran, Iraq, and Kuwait.

France and Palestine

France has been largely squeezed out of Syria and Lebanon by the course of the recent war. She (France) supported the Zionist cause hoping to get a strategic hold in the new state.

The U. S. S. R. and Palestine

One of the greatest pressures in the Near East is that exerted by the Soviet Union. Some have said that Great Britain might pull out of the Suez Canal and come to terms with Egypt if it were not for the shadow of the U. S. S. R. falling over the Near Eastern lands. The historic drive of Russia towards warm water ports is too familiar to describe here.

There has been a decided change in the Soviet attitude towards Palestine. After the Bolshevik revolution in 1917 Zionism in Russia was persecuted more than any other national movement. Hebrew was the only language considered counter-revolutionary in itself, and it was officially outlawed. Anti-Semitism, however, was forbidden. The reason for this is that Zionism was looked upon as the ally and spearhead of British imperialism. This ally of Great Britain could not be tolerated

in the U. S. S. R. (1)

Then came the 1939 White Paper and the war. Zionism was no longer so closely wedded to the British Empire. Very significantly in October 1943, Ivan Maisky, Vice-Commissar of Foreign Affairs, paid the first Soviet visit to Palestine. During the Nazi invasion, for the first time Russian Jewry was allowed to make contact with and appeal to world Jewry. In January, 1944, an exhibition showing the progress of the Jews in Palestine was admitted in Moscow. (2) In February, 1945, at a Trade Union Conference in London the Soviet delegate voted for a resolution supporting Palestine as a homeland for the Jews. (3) And so the examples multiply of the Soviet wooing of Palestine. That there may be grounds for cooperation on the Jewish side is seen in the partly socialized character of the Jewish agricultural economy in Palestine -- the collective and cooperative farms, and in the fact that so many of the Palestinian Jews are from Russia or other lands at present under Russian control. (4)

(1) Eliahu Ben-Horin, "The Soviet Wooing of Palestine", Harper's Magazine, April 1944, p. 414.

(2) Ibid., pp. 415-416.

(3) Grant S. McClellan, "Palestine and America's Role in the Middle East," Foreign Policy Reports, July 1, 1945, p.101.

(4) Ben-Horin, op. cit., p. 418.

Nor have the Soviets overlooked the Moslems. The Bolsheviks have increased their interest in the Moslem culture, languages and religion and have stressed the unity of Moslems in Russia with those abroad. Russia has recently established diplomatic relations with several of the Arab states. In 1944 pilgrims for the first time traveled from the Soviet Union to Mecca. (5) Verbally, the U. S. S. R. supports Arab demands of independence but distrusts the Arab League as a British creation.

Russia was very concerned with the conflict; For one thing she could hope to establish a military foothold. Other important reasons for their support to the Jews are:

1. They hoped to win new friends among the Zionist in the Western World, as well as in Palestine.
2. Russia wanted to see British influence and above all, British Military power weakened in the Middle East.
3. Russia wanted to damage American influence in the Middle East by encouraging the United States and backing her in the Jewish support. Russia is looking for the oil of Saudia Arabia.
4. Soviet experts believed that partition was certain to bring chaos and violence to the Middle East, which it did, and Russia will benefit from that chaos.

The Arab leaders had declared more than once that if the United States will continue supporting the Jews, sooner

(5) McClellan, op. cit., pp. 100-101.

or later they will be on the Soviet side. Zionists are using the same argument, that unless the United States will give them full support in the form of loans, \$500,000,000, arms and political backing, Israel will turn pro-Russian. Depending on the course of events, either the Arabs or the Zionists may prove right. What the Russians are hoping, of course, is that they will both prove right.(6)

The United States and Palestine

Because of the large and influential Jewish population in the United States it was natural for the Zionists to turn their attention to this country almost from the inception of their movement. The role which the United States has played in world affairs since 1914 made it necessary for them to obtain America's endorsement of their program, and if possible, its active support. They have succeeded in both.(7)

Politically, the Zionists have secured the American endorsement of their program as expressed in campaign statements which were merely to secure the Jewish votes, and prevailed to throw the weight of its influence on their side and sponsor their demands. On August 31, 1918, President Woodrow Wilson endorsed the Balfour Declaration as contained

(6) Kermit Roosevelt, Arab's Oil and History (New York: Harper Brothers, 1949), p. 247.

(7) Ibid., pp. 84, 99, 178, 198.

in the following letter addressed to Rabbi Stephen S. Wise,

"I have watched with deep and sincere interest the progress of the Zionist movement in the United States and in the Allied countries since the declaration by Mr. Balfour, on behalf of the English Government of Great Britain's approval of the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people." (8)

President Warren G. Harding said on June 1, 1921:

"It is impossible for one who has studied at all the services of the Hebrew people to avoid the faith that they will one day be restored to their historic national home and there enter on a new and yet greater phase of their contribution to the advance of humanity.(9)

President Calvin Coolidge on June 13, 1924, declared:

"I have so many times reiterated my interest in this great movement that anything which I might add would be a repetition of former statements, but I am nevertheless glad to have this opportunity to express again my sympathy with the deep and intense longing which finds such fine expression in the Jewish National Homeland in Palestine." (10)

President Herbert Hoover on September 21, 1928, asserted:

"I have watched with genuine admiration the steady and unmistakable progress made in the rehabilitation of Palestine.... It is very gratifying to note that many American Jews, Zionists as well as non-Zionists, have rendered such splendid service to this cause which merits the sympathy and moral encouragement of everyone."(11)

(8) Ray S. Baker, Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters, Vol.VIII, (New York, 1939), pp. 372 ff.

(9) Charles R. Gellent, The Palestine Problem, (Washington, D.C.: The Library of Congress, March 1, 1947), p. 111.

(10) Ibid., p. 112.

(11) Ibid., p. 112.

At the time Governor Franklin D. Roosevelt of New York was campaigning for the presidency in 1932 he wrote to President Morris Rothenberg of the Zionist Organization of America clarifying his position as to the Balfour Declaration and endorsing it. (12)

In 1938 President Roosevelt wrote a letter to Mayor Thomas J. Spellacy of Hartford on October 19 in which he expressed his sympathy with the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine. (13)

During the election of 1944, to get the Jewish votes as usual, the Democratic National Convention announced,

We favor the opening of Palestine to unrestricted Jewish immigration and colonization, and such a policy as to result in the establishment there of a free and democratic Jewish Common Wealth. (14)

On October, 1944, Governor Thomas E. Dewey, the Republican candidate for president, issued a statement endorsing the Zionist plans of his party and declaring that he was for the reconstitution of Palestine as a free and Democratic Jewish Common Wealth.

On October 15, 1944, President Roosevelt announced:

With the Traditional American Policy, I am convinced that the American people should give their support to this aim, and if reelected I shall help to bring about its realization. (15)

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- (12) Ibid., p. 112.
 (13) Ibid., p. 112.
 (14) Ibid., p. 113.
 (15) Ibid., p. 113.

Immediately following President Roosevelt's death, the Zionists trained their guns on his successor, Harry S. Truman and a week later newspaper readers were told that the problem of Palestine was upper-most in the president's mind, and was claiming more of his attention than any other. He declared:

"I am communicating directly with the British Government in an effort to have the doors of Palestine opened to those displaced persons who wish to go there.(16)

Yet 1946 was an election year, and some stand would have to be taken. On October 4, President Truman again issued a statement calling for the immediate admission of 100,000 Jews to Palestine. He also supported the Jewish Agency proposal for the creation of a viable Jewish state in control of its own immigration and economic policies in an adequate area of Palestine.(17)

The story behind this statement is simple and was partially reported at that time.(18) Messrs. Mead and Lehman, good Democrats, were waging a losing campaign for Governor and Senator respectively in New York State. Political leaders believe, though this has never been tested, the Zionist in

(16) R. W. Thompson, The Palestine Problem. (London: Andrew Melrose, 1947), p. 91.

(17) New York Times, Oct. 5, 1946, p. 2.

(18) See the article by James Reston in New York Times of Oct. 7, 1946, p. 4.

New York would vote as a bloc and might win or lose an election. In the heat of the campaign, Mead and Lehman informed the White House that a statement favoring Zionism must be made immediately, for Dewey, Mead's opponent, was reported to be on the point of issuing one himself.⁽¹⁹⁾ The White House referred the matter for drafting to the State Department, but was not satisfied with the State Department's first effort. Meanwhile New York called again: if President Truman did not issue a statement, Mead and Lehman would do so, publicly calling upon Mr. Truman to support it. Working under great pressure - domestic political pressure logically unrelated to Palestine - the October 4 statement was produced.

It was disturbing because it emphasized, more dramatically than ever before, but not for the first time, the blatant way in which local political concerns may determine American foreign policy. Even the timing was obvious - not only close to election day, but on the eve of an important Jewish religious festival. Many Jews deplored this appeal to deep religious sentiment for obviously political purposes.

The final act in the partition of Palestine was played out at the General Assembly in the fall of 1947. On October 11, the United States delegation declared itself, with a few

(19) New York Times, Oct. 7, 1946, p. 5.

reservations, in favor of the plan for partition as submitted by the United Nation's Special Committee.

The present course of world crisis will increasingly force upon Americans the realization that their national interests and those of the Jewish State in Palestine are going to conflict. It is to be hoped that American Zionists and non-Zionists alike will come to grips with the realization of the problem.⁽²⁰⁾ Mr. Kermit Roosevelt has expressed his concern in these words:

"If the future of our position in the Middle East is dark, at least the lesson to be learned from the Palestine case is clear. The process by which Zionist Jews have been able to promote American support for the partition of Palestine demonstrates the vital need of a foreign policy based on national rather than partisan interests. A Palestine Zionist, indeed may dismiss the Russian threat to the United States from his considerations, but an American may not, even if he is a Zionist, and as every American Zionist should think of himself as an American first, so should every Democrat and Republican. Only when the National interests of the United States, in their highest terms, take precedence over all other considerations, can a logical, foreseeing foreign policy be

(20) Kermit Roosevelt, "The Palestine Partition of Palestine", The Middle East Journal, Jan., 1948, p. 6.

evolved. No American political leader has the right to compromise American interest to gain partisan votes. The role the United States assumed in the Palestine question is not the responsibility of Zionists alone, but of each American citizen."(21)

As to the attitude of the State Department, Crum, a United States member of the Anglo-American Committee on Palestine, courageously stated that during his mission he was given a secret file from the State Department, the existence of which apparently not even president Truman had known. According to this file, since 1938, each time a promise was made to American Jewry regarding Palestine, the State Department promptly sent a message to the Arab rulers discounting it and reassuring them, in effect, that regardless of what was promised publicly to the Jews, "nothing would be done to change the situation in Palestine". This File, according to Crum, confirmed the charge of double-dealing that had been hurled at both the United States and Great Britain.(22)

President Truman's interference is understandable; he had nothing to lose. He receives the gratitude of all the Jews of America, but none of the Arabs' hatred, for there are few in the United States. It is as if Britain, to please her African Colonies interfered with the American color question.

(21) Ibid., p. 16.

(22) Bartely C. Crum, Behind the Silken Curtain, (Simon and Schuster, New York, 1947,) p. 36.

Palestine in Near Eastern Politics

Although small in size, Palestine has been a much coveted land, together with Syria, of which was a part until 1914, Palestine has been the meeting places of Asia, Africa and Europe, the East and the West. It has been the bridge of empire, the highway of commerce, the crossroads of the world.

Palestine is too small a country. It is closer in size to a county than a country. Its total area was ten thousand four hundred thirty square miles, about the size of the State of Vermont. You can circle it in an automobile between breakfast and dinner. From 10,000 feet in the air you can see all of it with the naked eye. It is only 160 miles long, with 70 miles wide at the broadest point.

Three Faiths

The Pope announced in 1947 that Palestine does not belong either to the Jews or to the Arabs, but that it belongs to every Christian, and every Christian nation, and on behalf of the Catholics all over the world he demanded that Palestine should be an international state under the United Nations rule.

But to the Jews of Palestine, it is the land of Israel and they believe that Jehovah gave it to Abraham; for God said, "Unto thy seed will I give this Land." In Jerusalem arose the Temple of Solomon. Here was the native soil of the prophets. Here are the sanctified places associated with

their lives.

For the Moslems, Palestine is the second sacred place after Mecca and Medina. They believe that their great prophet, Mohammed, once made a miraculous night-ride on an enchanted steed, from Mecca to the Haram esh-shariff (a holy place in Jerusalem) and then through the heavens with the angel Gabriel, back to the Haram, and once more through the skies to Mecca.

The General Assembly has requested the Special Committee "to give most careful consideration to the religious interests in Palestine of Islam, Judaism and Christianity."

The wording of the above request clearly indicates that the General Assembly had in mind not only the religious interests of three faiths whose millions of believers are spread over the world. For those believers Palestine is Holy Land, because it is associated with the origin and history of their respective religions, because it contains sites and shrines which they hold in particular veneration, and because close to and associated with many of those sites and shrines there are religious, educational and eleemoysnary establishments which the communities concerned wish to preserve.

Strategically, Palestine is a vital outpost against any threat to the Suez Canal. It is in the heart of the oil-rich Middle East, the mastery of which may well be a decisive factor in the struggle between the Western Democracies and the

Communist Slavic Countries.

There is no other section in the world that has the same amount of minerals as does the Dead Sea. (PCL = Potassium Chloride.) If all the nations of the world would use PCL from the Dead Sea, they would need one thousand years to exhaust it.

The chief attraction of the Middle East of which Palestine is a part lies, however, not so much in its wealth, as in its geographic position. The Eastern Mediterranean, the Suez Canal, the Persian Gulf -- the most vital sea routes in world trade and communications depend on the Middle East. It is the "Grand Central" of the world.

The Middle East has been a much coveted land. (23) Russian, German, British, French, and Italian, imperialists of every brand all turned to the Middle East in their search for conquest and aggrandizement. The Middle East is a mighty crossroad. He who holds that crossroad, can forbid the passage of commerce and of military supplies from Europe to Asia or Africa. The Middle East invented the wheel on which modern civilization is built, and it is now supplying oil to keep that wheel turning. (24)

(23) E. Ben-Horin, The Middle East, (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1943), p. 11.

(24) Fifty percent of the world's oil is in the Middle East and thirty-two percent in the United States. The production of one barrel is \$.06 in the Middle East, while it is from \$1.50 to \$3.00 in the United States. One well in Iran produces as much as 800 wells in the United States; one well in Saudi Arabia produces as much as 1,000 wells in the United States.

No European aggressor, whether Germany or Russia now, can march its armies into the oil lands, and the Dead Sea, or the treasure house of Africa, except through the Middle East.

The sea route from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean passes through the Mediterranean, the Suez Canal, and the Red Sea.

Two of the three major Asiatic routes run through the Arab East. (25) They are the shortest, cheapest, and safest routes -- Suez and the Palestine-Syrian Seaboard. The third is through Turkey. Hence, the Arab East provides one of the world's most important routes.

The air routes which link Europe with India, Ceylon, Burma, Malaya, South China, and Australia are dependent on refueling bases in Syria, Egypt, Palestine, and Saudi Arabia.

To paraphrase a geopolitician of the past generation, "Who controls the Middle East, controls the World Islands; and who controls the World Islands, controls the world."

(25) The Arab East consists of the Arabian Peninsula, the countries of the fertile crescent and Egypt; see, Problems of the Middle East, American Christian Palestine Committee, New York University, 1947, p. 1.

CHAPTER II
WAR PROMISES

Conflicting Promises -- The Creation of the Problem

When World War I began, the British Government immediately realized that the Turks and their German Allies could attack its life line with a double-barreled weapon. They could make Palestine the base for a military campaign against the Suez Canal. They could get the Turkish Sultan who was also Caliph, or religious leader, of all Mohammedans to proclaim a holy war against the Allies. Thus all Moslems from Morocco to India might be induced to take up arms against Great Britain in the hope that, dying, they would win eternal salvation. For was it not written that,

Whosoever falls in battle, his sins will be forgiven; at the day of judgment his wounds shall be resplendent as vermilion and odoriferous as musk and the loss of his limbs shall be supplied by the wings of angels and cherubims.(1)

The Turks fired both barrels, and the call was issued in the first month of Turkey's entry into war. First came the Fetva (a Fetva, in Arabic is Fatiwa; it is a formal pronouncement made by the appropriate theological authority on matters involving the interpretation of the Canon Law)(2)

(1) Caught from memory.

(2) Dr. Shiek Abo-Elusser Abideen, Issool Ashariha, (Islamic Law), (Damascus: Syrian University Press, 1939), p. 3.

rendered by the Shaikhal-Islam on the seventh of November, in which that dignitary, the highest theological official in the Ottoman Empire, declared it a sacred personal duty on all Moslems in the world, including those living under the rule of Great Britain, France, or Russia, to unite against those three enemies of Islam; to take up arms against them and their allies; and to refuse in all circumstances, even with the death penalty, to assist the governments of the Entente in their attacks on the Ottoman Empire and its German and Austro-Hungarian defenders. Then came the Sultan proclamation to the army and the fleet, issued on the eleventh, in which he exhorted them to fight for the liberation of enslaved Islam as well as in the defence of a threatened Empire; lastly, there was the manifesto to the Moslem world, issued on the twenty-third over the signatures of the Shaikhal-Islam and of the twenty-eight other religious dignitaries. The Sultan stated in the manifesto, "I command that his manifesto be distributed in all the Moslem countries." It called upon all the Moslems of the world, whether subjects of the Entente Powers or not to obey the injunctions of the Holy Book as interpreted by the sacred Fetva, and participate in the defence of Islam and the Holy Places. But the attack on the Suez Canal fell flat and the holy war, when it was proclaimed, proved to be a dud.

One reason for this failure was that the Arabic-speaking inhabitants of Syria and Arabia were discontented under the

Turkish yoke and were therefore not at all eager to fight for their masters. Thus when the Sultan-Caleph proclaimed the Holy War, the Arabian King Hussein refused to allow it to be preached in the mosques of the Holy Cities. He took no further action and the next move came from the British side.

The British hoped they might persuade the Arabs and their King Hussein to start a rebellion against the Turkish Government. For that reason Britain opened negotiations with King Hussein. She promised that the independence of the Arabian Peninsula and Syria would be assured when peace was made.

Sir Henry McMahon, then High Commissioner in Egypt, on behalf of the British Government, wrote to Sharif Hussein and assured him in return for his help and pledge, that England had promised to recognize an independent and united Arab State east of the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. The Arabs entered the war in 1916. They worked from Arabia under Feisal (Hussein's son) and Lawerance. That the Arabs rendered the Allied cause valuable assistance and completely fulfilled their side of the bargain has never been questioned. The only point under dispute is whether the British pledge included Palestine or not. The correspondence between Hussien and McMahon which began in July, 1915 and ended in January, 1916, is too long and complicated to examine here. For over twenty years the British Government refused to publish the

correspondence. The correspondence was finally released to the world in 1939.(3)

Part of the publication is as follows: King Hussein wrote Sir Henry on July 18, 1915, outlining the terms on which he was willing to lead an Arab revolt against Turkey. His first condition was the following:

England was to acknowledge the independence of the Arab countries, bounded on the north by Messina and Adana up to the 37° of latitude, up to the borders of Persia, on the south by the Indian Ocean, with the exception of Aden to remain as it is, and the west by the Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea. England is to approve of the proclamation of an Arab Khalifate of Islam.(4)

Part of the McMahon letter of October 24, 1915 to King Hussein is as follows:

I am empowered in the name of the Government of Great Britain to give you the following assurance and make the following reply to your letter. Subject to the above modification Great Britain is prepared to recognize and support the independence of the Arabs within the territories included in the limits and boundaries proposed by the Sheriff of Mecca.(5)

The Sykes-Picot Agreement

No sooner had Sir McMahon clinched his bargain with Sheriff Hussein than conversations were opened by Great Britain with France and Russia. The French delegate was F. George Picot, who had served in Syria as consul prior to the War, and

(3) Maugham Robin, op. cit., p. 29.

(4) Britain Parliamentary Papers, 1938-39, The Hussein-McMahon Correspondence, "Antonius," pp. 164-183. See Appendix I.

(5) See Appendix. No. I.

and Sir Mark Sykes. The two delegates together with Russia drew up a scheme dividing what they had promised to be an independent country under Hussein. It was thus divided up into what we call today Syria, Lebanon (which was given to France); Iraq, Palestine, and Trans-Jordan (which was given to Great Britain). While Russia obtained Eryerum, Trebizond, Van Bittis and the Southern Part of Kurdistan.

The Sykes-Picot Agreement has two aims:

- (1) It was to cut up the Arab land in such a manner as to place artificial obstacles in the way of unity.
- (2) Another aim was self interest in a land full of riches and oil. (6)

So everyone of the three powers had helped himself to generous slices of the Sultan's dominions.(7) Teachers always make it a point when they teach history in the Middle East to say that "England has betrayed the Arabs". I was told this in the fourth grade.

The Balfour Declaration

England had made a third agreement as a promise. In 1917 the Allied cause was desperate. Russia was dropping out

(6) Library of Congress, Public Affairs Bulletin No. 50, The Palestine Problem (Washington, D.C., March 1, 1947), p. 20.
D. George, The Truth About the Peace Treaties, Vol. II, London, 1938, p. 1038.

See: H. W. Temperley, A History of the Peace Conference of Paris, Vol. V (London, 1926), pp. 13-17.

(7) Russia's part in the agreement was terminated by the Bolshevik Revolution. See Library of Congress, Palestine Problem, p. 20.

of the War, and the United States had not yet entered the war, and Britain and France needed every ounce of available aid. As a result Britain wanted to secure the propaganda support of the Zionists and the wholehearted support in Europe and the United States. More than this, Britain was trying to get in on the ground floor by fore-stalling the enemy, for Germany too was holding out tempting bait to the Zionists. It was proposed that the Jews should have Palestine. But it was too late for Germany and Britain had already captured Palestine. Britain made another bargain with the Zionists. Arthur James Balfour, as a foreign secretary on behalf of Britain and Dr. Chaim Weizmann as the Zionist spokesman made an agreement as follows (from Balfour to Lord Rothschild), Nov. 8, 1917:

I have much pleasure in conveying to you on behalf of his Majesty's Government the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations, which has been submitted to and approved by the cabinet. His Majesty's Government view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious right of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country. I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation. (8)

(8) Library of Congress, The Palestine Problem, p. 6.
United Nations World, Vol. 1, No. 4 (May, 1947).
 See: Parliament Debate, House of Commons, p. 1248.
 See: W. Henry Cooke and Edith P. Stickney, Readings in European International Relations Since 1879, (New York: Harper Brothers Publishers, 1931), p. 538.

The United States Government for a while was prevented from publicly endorsing the Balfour Declaration because it was not at war with Turkey. But after the necessary break with Turkey was made, President Wilson endorsed the Balfour Declaration in a letter to Rabbi Stephen S. Wise on August 31, 1918, in which he indicated his approval of the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine.(9)

Whether the President was correct or not in his assumptions regarding the agreement of the "Allied Nations", he at least made perfectly clear that the United States Government was interpreting the phrase "national home" in a sense much desired by the Zionists; that is, that Palestine should eventually contain a Jewish state.

In this connection there is often quoted as favoring the Arab side the twelfth of President Wilson's famous Fourteen Points, outlined on January 8, 1918, concerning the Ottoman Empire (which included Palestine). It ran as follows:

The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development....(10)

(9) Ray S. Baker, Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters, Vol. Viii, (New York: 1939), pp. 372-373.

(10) W. MacDonald, Documentary Source Book of American History, (New York, 1926), p. 672.

The Arabs have claimed that Wilson's promise of "autonomous development" applied to them and that this promise was in conflict with the Zionist interpretation of the Balfour Declaration.

The plain fact is that contradictory promises, of equal importance, to the people concerned, were made by the British authorities and that in each case they were accepted in good faith by the recipient. The fears aroused, by both the Balfour Declaration and the Sykes-Picot agreement, caused a group of seven representative Arabs in Cairo to address a memorandum to the British Government. In reply, the British Government quoted the proclamation made by the commander-in-chief on the occasion of the capture of Jerusalem in December, 1917, only a month after the issuing of the Balfour Declaration. In this proclamation it was officially stated:

That the policy of the British Government towards Palestine was that the future government of that territory should be based upon the principle of the consent of the governed. The Arab leaders were assured that this would always be the policy of his Majesty's Government. (11)

On July 4, 1918, President Wilson laid down the following principle as one of the four great ends for which the associated peoples of the world were fighting:

The settlement of every question, whether of

(11) The Future of Palestine, Arab Office, Imperial Central, Geneva, 1947, p. 106.

territory, of sovereignty, of economic arrangement, or of political relationship upon the basis of the free acceptance of that settlement by the people immediately concerned, and not upon the basis of the material interest, or advantage of any other nation of people which may desire a different settlement for the sake of its own exterior influence or mastery.(12)

England hailed Wilson's Points but went ahead and divided the country with France and promised the Zionist the National Home without consulting any of the inhabitants of that country.

The Arabs protested against the allies' acts and the division of their land into so many separate governments. "Both measures were temporary expedients," General Allenby told, and assured the Arabs, "In the final settlement your wishes shall be respected."

The news of the Balfour Declaration reached the Arab world first in Egypt where it provoked a wave of protest. When it reached Hussein, who by this time had assumed the title of King of the Hejaz, he was greatly disturbed and asked for an explanation. The British sent Commander David G. Hogarth to confer with King Hussein in January, 1918, at Jeddah. Commander Hogarth's message was delivered orally, but King Hussein wrote it down. The Englishman assured the King that "Jewish settlement in Palestine would only be allowed in so far as would be consistent with political and

(12) W. MacDonald, op. cit., p. 672.

economic freedom of the Arab population.(13)

The Meaning of the Balfour Declaration

There is no denying the momentous importance of the Balfour Declaration. It has stood, up to the present time, as the basic document of the whole Palestine problem while the others were hidden. Jews, Arabs, the British and other governments concerned have battled endlessly over its exact meaning. It has been interpreted to the advantage first of one side and then of the other, as the circumstances of the situation demanded. In the comments of the press at the time, it is clear that some newspapers interpreted Balfour's statement as a promise that Palestine might possibly become, in time, a Jewish state.(14) Such an interpretation has often been accepted, especially by the Jews. But as time advances, interpretation of the Balfour Declaration proved not to be so simple. The British Government in particular later saw fit to attach a more limited significance to its phraseology.

Of one thing there seems to be little doubt -- the document was carefully weighed by all parties concerned and every phrase and comma deliberated. If there is vagueness

(13) Charles R. Gallner, The Library of Congress, The Palestine Problem, op. cit., p. 11.

(14) See Sokolow, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 84097, for a selection of newspaper comment favorable to the Balfour Declaration.

in its terms, it is not accidental.

....In his Zionism Mr. Leonard Stein says, "The Balfour Declaration was by no means a casual gesture. It was issued after prolonged deliberations as a considered statement of policy." In Temperley's History of the Peace Conference of Paris, it is stated that "before the British Government gave the Declaration to the world, it had been closely examined in all its bearings and implications, and subjected to repeated change and amendment." M. Nahum Sokolev, in his History of Zionism, in London was tested by the Zionist Organization in America, and every suggestion in America received the most careful attention in London." ...Mr. Lloyd George himself, speaking in Wales in 1930, assured his hearers, in curious terms, that the Declaration "was prepared after much consideration, not merely of its policy but of its actual wording." (15)

Prince Faisal and the American Commission

In 1919 Prince Faisal went to France to attend the peace conference. France did not recognize him and made it clear to him that he was not welcome. Faisal realized that imperialism was threatening all the Arab lands. Becoming conscious of his own weakness and the big influence of the Zionist; he told the delegates at the peace conference that the Arabs wanted complete and immediate independence. He suggested an International Commission to be sent to Syria.

The American President supported Faisal according to his doctrine. He named Dr. Henry C. King and Mr. Charles R. Crane as United States representative to the proposed commission. But Clemeneau and Lloyd George did not agree and blocked

(15) J.M.N. Jeffri~~es~~s, Palestine the Reality. (London: 1939)
P. 172

the move. President Wilson sent his representatives alone. They spent the summer of 1919 in Syria and Palestine and returned with a report which bears witness to their keen foresight and courage. (16)

In the report the Arabs wanted complete independence, but might accept the mandate for a limited time, on condition that the mandate will be entrusted to the United States.

A national home for the Jewish people is not equivalent to making Palestine into a Jewish State; nor can the reaction of such a Jewish State be accomplished without the gravest trespassing upon the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine. There would then be no reason why Palestine could not be included in a United Syrian State, just as other portions of the country, the holy places being cared for by an international and inter-religious commission somewhat as at present, under approval of the mandatory and the League of Nations. The Jews of course, would have representatives upon this commission.

On April 25, 1920 at the San Remo meeting of the Allied Supreme Council, consisting of Great Britain, France, and Italy, it was decided to give the mandate over Iraq, Trans-Jordan, and Palestine to Britain, and those over Syria and

(16) Memorandum by His Majesty's Government, Political History of Palestine, Jerusalem, 1947, p. 2.

Lebanon to France. This decision was announced on May 5, in the year of 1920. In July, 1922, the Council of the League of Nations, which Great Britain then dominated, ratified the draft mandate for Palestine, and other parts of the Arab lands, that had been submitted to the League.(17)

Examining the Palestine mandate itself, we can see Great Britain has been commissioned by the League to rule in the spirit of the Balfour Declaration. The keynote provision reads:

The mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish National Home and the development of self-governing institution, and also for safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion.(18)

It is not an easy job to get another people to live in somebody else's land. Moreover, the mandatory power was to encourage local self-government (which she never did). It was to recognize an appropriate Jewish agency as a public body to advise and cooperate with the governing authorities of Palestine, and to assist the development of the National Home. Jewish immigration was to be facilitated, but the rights and positions of other sections of the population were

(17) Library of Congress, Palestine Problem, Op. cit., p. 27. See UN World, Vol. I, No. 4, May 1947.

(18) Memorandum by His Majesty's Government, op. cit., p. 1.

not to be injured thereby. The Jews were to be encouraged to settle closely on the land, to develop and improve the soil so that many more people could earn their living on a given plot.

English, Arabic and Hebrew were all declared to be the official languages. Three languages and three Sabbaths, Friday for the Moslems, Saturday for the Jews, and Sunday for the Christians -- in a district the size of New Hampshire.

The root of the trouble in Palestine was that England put its military government in force and not a Palestinian government. All powers were centered around the British High Commissioner and his deputies. There was no constitution except the mandate. England from the beginning never tried to unite the Arabs and Jews, and to end the division between the rival races.

CHAPTER III
IMPERIALISM IN ACTION

Blood Shed, Commissions and White Papers

The Military Committee

Feeling that Great Britain had betrayed them, the Arabs for the first time in their history resorted to violence against the Jews. In April, 1920, five Jews were killed and over 200 injured in a clash between Telaviv and Jaffe. A Military Committee of Inquiry (the Civil Administration was not then established) found that the causes of the outbreak were:

- (1) The disappointment of the Arabs at the non-fulfillment of the promises of independence which had been given to them during the first war.
- (2) The belief of the Arabs that the Balfour Declaration implied a denial of the right of self-determination.
- (3) A propaganda from outside with the growth of nationalism.

In May 1921, a year later, more serious attacks made by the Arabs on the Jews of Jaffa and five rural settlements. On this occasion forty-seven Jews were killed and 146 wounded. A commission of inquiry, headed by Sir Thomas Haycraft, reached the conclusion that:

- (1) Great Britain, when she took over the administration, of Palestine, was led by the Zionists to adopt a policy mainly directed toward the establishment of a

national home for the Jews and not to the equal benefit of all Palestinians. (1)

In 1922 Winston Churchill, as Colonial Secretary, issued a statement of policy, The White Paper of 1922, in which his Majesty's Government pointed out and defined the limits of the Jewish National Home and the functions of the Jewish Agency, assuring the Arabs that it was not the intention of Great Britain to submerge them or their language and culture, or saddle them with Jewish nationality. But the Arabs remained unreconciled to Zionism.

In 1924 violence flared again, and again it was quickly put down by the British. The Arabs refused to be reassured by statements of principle which failed to face the implications of incessant immigration of Zionist influence. But still nothing was done to remove the cause of trouble.

In August, 1929, Arabs and Jews again clashed. Before the British could restore order 135 Jews and 116 Arabs had been killed, and 339 Jews and 232 Arabs wounded.

London at last took notice of the seriousness of the situation and appointed a Commission of Inquiry headed by Sir Walter Shaw to study the situation and the cause of the trouble. The commission went to the Holy Land, surveyed conditions there, listened to both Arabs and Jews, questioned government

(1) Memorandum by His Britannic Majesty's Government, The Political History of Palestine under British Administration, Palestine: 1947, Presented to the UN Special Committee on Palestine, p. 3.

officials, then returned to London. The commission said:

The fundamental cause of violence and fighting is the Arab feeling of animosity and hostility towards the Jews, the disappointment of their political and national aspiration and fear of their economic future.(2)

In less than ten years three serious attacks have been made by the Arabs on the Jews. Eighty years before the first of these attacks there is no recorded instance of any similar incidents. The Arabs have come to see in the Jewish immigration not only a menace to their livelihood but a possible overlord of the future.

In October, 1930, the British Government issued a White Paper in which they pointed out the following:

The capacity of the country to absorb new immigration must be judged in relation to Arab as well as Jewish unemployment. The obligation to facilitate Jewish immigration and to encourage close settlement by Jews on the land remains a positive obligation of the mandate. His Majesty's Government does not contemplate any stoppage or prohibition of Jewish immigration in any of its categories.(3)

In its report to the Council of the League of Nations, the mandates commission criticized the mandatory government for not having concerned itself more actively with the social and economic development of the country. The increase in Jewish immigration from 1933 was accompanied by an intensification

(2) Great Britain Parliamentary Papers, 1930, cmd. 3530, p.3.
See UN World Vol. I, No. 4, May 1947.

(3) See Britannic Majesty's Government, op. cit., p. 13.
Great Britain Parliamentary Papers, op. cit., pp. 11-14.

of Arab political activity. (4)

In October 1933, the Arab Executive proclaimed a general strike and organized a demonstration outside the government offices in Jerusalem. The demonstrators clashed with the police and during the next few weeks other riots took place in Jaffa, Nablus, Haifa, and again in Jerusalem. The disturbance of 1933 differed from those of 1920 and 1929, in that they were directed not against the Jews but against the mandatory government which was accused of tilting the balance against the Arabs in its administration of the mandate.

It was hoped that sooner or later the Arabs would be reconciled to Zionism, thus the British and Zionists policy was based upon that hope. So it was desirable to postpone the grant of self-governing institutions until such time as the Arab attitude had changed. Its genuine self-government was established immediately while the Arab majority was inflexible opposed to Zionism, that would make impossible the fulfillment of British obligation to the Zionist.

In 1936, the Arab national committee ordered a general strike to begin April 22, and to continue until Great Britain altered its policy. Two weeks later the same committee called on the Arabs to refuse to pay taxes. Violence flared in many parts of Palestine; the pipe lines which carry the Iraq oil to Haifa was punctured repeatedly. Hundreds of

Arabs were herded into ordinary jails and collective fines were levied against villages. The seemingly unsuccessful strike, in which the entire Arab population, Moslem as well as Christian, participated, continued.

Military reinforcements began to arrive in May, and by September there were two British divisions in the country. The high commissioner was empowered to establish a military tribunal. The government refused to listen to the "Arab case" or to offer any concession in return for the cessation of the strike and the restoration of order.

A Royal Commission, under the chairmanship of Lord Peel, was appointed in August 1936, with the task to investigate and recommend a way out of the dilemma. It also sent General Dill with an additional division of troops to quell the disturbance. (4)

The Royal Commission reported that the underlying causes of the disturbance were:

- (1) The desire of the Arabs for national independence.
- (2) Their hatred and fear of the establishment of the Jewish immigration and the national home. (5)

(4) The Round Table (A Quarterly Review of the Politics of the British Commonwealth): "Palestine the Wider Hope", Vol. XXIX, December 1938, pp. 252-277.

(5) Great Britain Parliamentary Papers 1937, op. cit., pp. 89, 97.

As a solution, the commission offered a complicated plan to partition the country into two separate and independent states -- one Arab, one Jewish, with a British zone between. The Arab State was to be set up in Samaria and Judea and the Southern desert. The Jewish State was to be set up in Galilee and on the Philistine Plain. The British area was to include Jerusalem and Bethlehem, with a corridor to Jaffa on the coast. This suggestion was hailed by the British Government as an excellent way out of the Palestine dilemma. (6)

On September 14, 1937, the British Foreign Secretary requested the council of the League of Nations to approve the proposed partition of Palestine. On September 16, the League Council adopted the resolution, and asked the mandatory to prepare a detailed plan for the partition of Palestine.

In February 1938, a technical commission was appointed under the chairmanship of Sir John Woodhead. The commission arrived in Palestine on the 27th of April and left on the 3rd of August. In a White Paper issued with the report of the partition commission, his Majesty's Government announced:

They have reached the conclusion that his further examination has shown that the political administrative and financial difficulties involved in the proposal to

(6) For convenient summary of the Peel Report See Great Britain, Palestine Royal Commission, Summary of Report (Colonial 135), London 1937.

create independent Arab and Jewish States inside Palestine are so great that this solution of the problem is impracticable. (7)

The British Government announced a policy which accompanied the publication of the Woodhead report, that suggested an agreement between the Arabs and the Jews might be possible.

On February 17, 1938, the London Conference was attended on the one side by representatives of the Arabs of Palestine and of the Government of Egypt, Iraq, Saudia Arabia, and Yemen, and on the other hand the Jewish Agency for Palestine. Since the Arabs maintained their refusal to recognize the Jewish Agency, it was necessary to organize two separate conferences, an Anglo-Arab and the other Anglo-Jewish. The British Delegation presented proposals similar to those which were subsequently published in the White Paper (May 1939). They were rejected by the Jews in principle, and no agreement was reached. (8)

The Arabs were aroused by the partition plan and they were driven to desperation with the policy of the mandatory and with the continued influx of the Jews and the passage of

(7) Great Britain Parliamentary Papers 1937, op. cit., p. 3. See also Round Table: "Palestine A Leaf Turned", March 1939, p. 457. See Congressional Records - House, February 24, 1947. Vol. 93, Part 1, p. 1392.

(8) Memorandum by His Majesty's Government, op. cit., p. 26. See New York Times, Feb. 3, 1947, pp. 8, 4.

land into Jewish hands. They decided to stake everything on a final showdown. Bands of men attacked the British in various parts of Palestine. Considerable numbers of young men from the neighboring states crossed the borders to join the Arab guerrillas in the hills of the Holy Land.

The British answered with a mighty show of force. The police and the army units in the country were thrown into action, more troops arrived in Palestine, military law was declared, and curfew imposed. More Arab leaders were arrested or exiled.

The guerrilla Arab bands became more organized, and arms and money were smuggled across the frontiers into Palestine. Rebel courts were established for the trial of Arabs accused of disloyalty to the national cause. Travel was forbidden by the mandatory without prior authorization. The imposition of a collective fine on Arab communities became more frequent. Innocent men were shot on the slightest suspicion. Over 1,000 homes were destroyed by British troops. The Arabs continued to resist by conducting a psychological campaign which proved both annoying and embarrassing to the British. In an endeavor to win the sympathy of the British tommies, the Arabs told them the reason for their rebellion and assured them that their only quarrel with the British was the pro-Zionist policy of the Government. This appeal was so successful that soldiers were forbidden to associate with the Arabs. The Arabs

found other ways to present their case to the troops. Little boys managed to enter the army camps and sell the soldiers fruit wrapped in paper containing a printed statement of the Arab case. School children wearing tin pans for helmets and using tin kettles for drums mimicked the troops as they went through their drill and maneuvers, making them acutely conscious of the fact that they (British) were fighting an unarmed and helpless people.

In some towns, the Arabs conducted funeral services for "British Justice" and solemnly escorted the coffin to its grave in a fitting procession.

Thousands of English soldiers disagreed with the government on her policy. They sent many letters back to England telling how they were sent there to be killed for the cause of Zionism. H. G. Wells described British feeling in these words:

In England there is a growing irritation at the killing and wounding of British soldiers and Arabs in pitched battles fought because of this Zionist idea. They are beginning to feel that if they are to be history-ridden to the extent of restoring a Jewish State that was extinguished nearly two thousand years ago, they might just as well go back another thousand years and sacrifice their sons to restore the Canaanites and Philistines.(9)

Finally on May 1939, England feared an anti-English movement in the Middle East. His Majesty's Government determined

(9) Liberty, December 24, 1938, p. 67.

to put an end to the bloodshed in the Holy Land. She decided to impose her own solution on both Arabs and Jews. This solution was outlined in the White Paper. The British Government stated that from 1922-38 the population had increased 90 percent. The Jews increased from 55,000 to 316,018 from 1914 to 1938. (The non-Jewish increase was a 55 percent increase, while the Jewish increase was 47 percent). Two thirds of the Jewish immigrants came from Western Europe.

The White Paper dealt with the cause of the trouble and made public the McMahon-Hussein letters for the first time.

- (1) The White Paper zoned the land into three categories.
 - a. Areas where Jews could buy.
 - b. Areas where Jews could buy, but only with government sanction.
 - c. Areas where Jews could not buy.

- (2) Immigration: The White Paper limited the Jewish immigration to Jewish population, plus 75,000. "No further immigration will be permitted unless the Arabs of Palestine are prepared to acquiesce it." (10)

In June 1939, the permanent mandate commission of the League at their 36th session examined the White Paper of 1939. The commission reported:

The policy set out in the White Paper was not in accordance with the interpretation which, in agreement with the

(10) Memorandum by His Majesty's Government, op. cit., p. 28. See also Great Britain Parliamentary Papers 1939, Cmd. 6019, pp. 6-11; UN World, Vol. I, No. 4, May 1947.

mandatory power and the council, the commission had always placed upon the Palestine Mandate.(11)

Three out of seven members were unable to share this opinion, they considered that existing circumstances would justify the policy of the White Paper, provided the council did not oppose it.(12)

(11) Ibid., p. 29.

(12) League of Nations Permanent Mandate Commission, Minutes of the Thirty Sixth Session, (Geneva: 1939), p. 275.

CHAPTER IV

IMPERIALISM BEGETS TERRIORMISM

The Zionist Revolution

We shall fight with Great Britain in this war as if there were no White Paper and we shall fight the White Paper as if there were no war.

... Ben Goruin

The Arabs first attacked the policy presented in the White Paper, objecting to the additional 75,000 Jewish immigrants. Eventually the Arabs became reconciled to it.

Now it was the turn of the Jews to fight the mandatory, by bombing, assassinating and kidnaping against the British. The Jewish terrorists were better armed, better organized, and possessed greater technical skill than the Arab guerrillas of 1936. Government buildings, trains, railroads, shops, and highway bridges have been repeatedly blown up. The Jews declared that the solution of the White Paper was unacceptable to them. They insisted on unlimited immigration and the postponement of democratic government until the Jews had become a majority. Later they specifically demanded the establishment of a Jewish State.

In 1942 a small group of Zionist extremists, led by Abraham Stern, came into prominence with a series of politically motivated murders. (1) The high commissioner narrowly

(1) Washington Star, January 2, 1947. and New York Times, January 2, 1947, March 3, 1947, pp. 7,8.

escaped death in an ambush outside Jerusalem. On November 6, 1944, the British Minister of State in the Middle East (Lord Mayne) was assassinated in Cairo by two members of the Stern group.

The Hagana (an illegal military formation controlled by the Jewish Agency) and the Irgun Zvai Leumi (another illegal Jewish organization) were responsible for much destruction of government property during 1944.(2) The King David Hotel in Jerusalem containing the officers of the government, was blown up killing 86 public servants. The terrorists kidnapped a British Judge and British officers. British civilian and military families were evacuated from Palestine.

Due to the continuation of Jewish terrorism in Palestine, Lieut. General Sir Alan G. Cunningham, the High Commissioner for Palestine, issued a strong statement on June 29, 1946, denouncing lawlessness in Palestine and expressing firm determination to restore order. The premises of the Jewish Agency in Palestine were occupied and members of the Jewish Agency Executive were arrested. This was followed by the publication of a British White Paper on July 24, which, on the basis of various intercepted messages, claimed to link

(2) Arthur Koestler, Rise of the Hagana (New York: McMillan Book Co., 1947), pp. 66-98. See New York Times, Nov. 14, 1945.

the Jewish Agency to terrorist activity in Palestine. The Hagana, the Irgun Zvai Leumi and the Stern gang were all accused of violence on the basis of the evidence presented.(3)

The Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry

When the second war came to an end, it was not possible for the mandatory power to give full effect to the policy set out in the White Paper of 1939. The tragic fate of the Jewish people in Europe had created a demand that the Palestine problem should be examined again. The demand was strong in the United States. In August 1945, President Truman wrote to Mr. Attlee suggesting that the concession of 100,000 immigration certificates for Palestine would be an important contribution to the settlement of displaced European Jews.(4) Speaking at Bournemouth, England, on June 12, 1946, Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin said, in regard to Palestine:

I hope it will not be misunderstood in America if I say, with the purest of motives, that that was because they did not want too many of them in New York.(5)

The British Government did not adopt this proposal but accordingly obtained the agreement of the United States to

(3) Text given in New York Times, July 25, 1946. The above quoted from the Library of Congress, Palestine Problem.

(4) Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 18, 1945, p. 790.

(5) New York Times, June 13, 1946, p. 1.

the appointment of an Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry.

The twelve members of the Anglo-American Committee after a work of 120 days recommended a new plan. Under this plan the greater part of Palestine would be divided into Arab and Jewish provinces. Each province would have an elected legislature and an executive. The one hundred thousand Jews should go to their province.(6) Here we see England has won a great game of politics by getting America to take part in the deal. During those days I was in Damascus and the Syrian University's students went to the English delegation to protest against the admitting of 100,000 immigrants to Palestine. The English Consul told the students "that is Mr. Truman's suggestion. We have nothing to do with it." The result was the the American Consulate was burned that day in Syria, Egypt, and Iraq.

The London Conference

It had been the intention of his Majesty's Government to consult the interested parties before reaching a final decision on their policy on Palestine. Invitations to a conference in London were issued on the 25th of July to the governments of the Arab League, to the Jewish Agency for Palestine, and to the Palestine Arab Higher Executive.(7)

(6) See map next page.

(7) New York Times, January 7, 1947: 1, 3.

The conference opened on September 9, 1946. The British Delegation put the provincial autonomy plan before the conference. The Arab Delegates at once made it clear that they were opposed to this plan in principle and could not accept it as a basis for discussion as it would eventually lead to partition. The Arab Delegates propounded their solution that Palestine would be a unitary State with a permanent Arab majority and would attain its independence after a short period of transition (two or three years) under British mandate. (8)

The Zionist congress met at Basle and denounced the plan of provincial autonomy. The congress announced that Palestine be established as a Jewish commonwealth integrated in the structure of the Democratic World. (9)

On February 7, 1947, the British Delegation at the Anglo-Arab conference submitted new proposals, which were also communicated to the Jewish Agency. These provided for a five-year period of British trusteeship over Palestine, with the declared object of preparing the country for independence.

The latest British proposals were rejected both by Arabs

(8) New York Times, September 12, 1946.

(9) Washington Star, January 6, 1947. Washington Post, Dec. 24, 1946. New York Times, Dec. 29, 1946. The Nation, Jan. 25, 1947. Baltimore Sun, Dec. 9, 1946.

and by the Jews. The situation in Palestine became so dangerous, that the British ordered the evacuation of British women and children. Even the presence of 100,000 British troops in the country has failed to end the reign of terror which Jewish leaders insist is the work of a small faction of Palestine Jews. (10)

Finally, realizing that England was blamed by both Arabs and Jews, and partly because of the pro-Zionist attitude of the United States government and the continued prodding by Washington, the British Government, in September 1947 dramatically told the United Nations Assembly that it was planning to terminate the mandate and to evacuate its troops and civil servants from Palestine as soon as possible; thereupon the mandatory decided to refer the problem to the United Nations. (11)

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- (10) Congressional Record, House, Vol. 93, Part 1, p. 1392.
See United Nations World, Vol. I, No. 4, May 1947.
New York Times, Feb. 5, 1947, 1:24.
- (11) United Nations World, Ibid.;
New York Times, Feb. 3, 8:4.
Congressional Record, Ibid., p. 1392.

PART II

"PRESSURE OF POLITICS"

(The Solution of the Problem)

CHAPTER I

THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PALESTINE

The First Move

It has been said that:

The United States Department of State on March 28, 1947, informed the British Ambassador in Washington, D.C., that the United States would support a request by Great Britain for the convening of a special session of the General Assembly at its regular session in September 1947.(1)

His Majesty's Government considered that these proposals were consistent with the terms of both the League Mandate, and the United Nations Charter. On February 18, 1947, a decision had been announced to the House of Commons by the Foreign Secretary of State. In the course of his speech he said:

His Majesty's Government have been faced with an irreconcilably conflict of principles. There are in Palestine about 1,200,000 Arabs and 600,000 Jews. In 1914 there were 55,000 Jews in Palestine. For the Jews, the essential point of principle is the creation of a Sovereign Jewish State. For the Arabs the essential point of principle is to resist to the last the establishment of a Jewish Sovereignty in any part of Palestine. His Majesty's Government have of themselves no

(1) Joseph Dunner, The Republic of Israel (New York: McCary-Hill, 1950), p. 75.

power, under the terms of the mandate, to award the country either to the Arabs or to the Jews, or even to partition it between them. We shall then ask the United Nations to consider our report, and to recommend a settlement of the problem. We do not intend ourselves to recommend any particular solutions.(2)

Here we see the significance of the British (tactics) in politics; to save her face, save her interest in the Near East, England handed the problem to the United Nations and stepped out of the deal leaving a black page of her history in the eyes of the Arabs, Moslems, and the Zionists all over the world.

The United Nations was called at a critical moment in the history of Palestine to accept the challenge as a last chance for the solving of this problem in a peaceful and fair manner. If this chance was missed, chaos and disorders might result in Palestine more than what happened and what is happening (as we see later).

The Battle of the Agenda

On April 2, 1947, Great Britain requested the United Nations to place the Palestine question on the agenda of the next regular session of the General Assembly and to call a special session as soon as possible for the purpose of appointing a committee to study the problem. The request was promptly granted, and the special session opened on April 28, 1947.(3)

(2) Memorandum by His Majesty's Government, Political History of Palestine, Jerusalem, 1947, p. 40. United Nations Bulletin, April 15, 1948, p. 305;

(3) New York Times, April 3, 1947, 1:7.

Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudia Arabia, Syria, and Yemen requested that a proposal for the termination of the mandate over Palestine and the declaration of independence also be placed on the agenda. When the American delegate objected vigorously the Arab request was rejected.(4) Russian delegates asked that the proposed committee be instructed to submit a plan for the independence of Palestine. This request was also opposed by the Americans and was accordingly rejected.(5)

Andrei Gromyko, the Russian Delegate announced that partition is the best alternate solution for Palestine, and here (for the first time) the United States Delegate hailed the solution and added such as the inclusion of question of displaced European Jews within the scope of the inquiry. The Arabs were convinced that the United States, the most influential member of the United Nations was already committed to uphold the demand of the Jewish Agency for the Jewish State.

From the start the Arab Delegates tried to prevent the Jewish Agency from getting a hearing. Austin, the United States Delegate, argued that the "sacred" charter of the United Nations must be upheld and the Jewish Agency be permitted to appear before the General Assembly. Poland, the

(4) United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, Report to the General Assembly, London Office, 1947, p. 1.

(5) New York Times, April 3, 1947, 1:7.

country which for many a decade has been expelling Jews in large numbers, put considerable pressure on the United Nations to give careful consideration to the point of view of the Jewish people in the Palestine question. A compromise solution was made. Spokesmen of both the Arab Higher Committee and the Jewish Agency were permitted to appear, not before the General Assembly itself but before the Political and Security Committee of the General Assembly.(6)

In the middle of the general debate Mr. Gromyko tossed a diplomatic bombshell into the deliberations of the United Nations General Assembly by supporting a plan which all Arab spokesmen had repudiated as imperialism. Russia did this because two thirds of the immigrants that entered Palestine were from the eastern part of Europe, and also to get a foothold in the Middle East.

Thus the battle of the Agenda was a long one.

It took four meetings of the General Committee and two meetings of the General Assembly until a decision on the Agenda was reached to grant a hearing to two non-governmental agencies before one of its main committees.(7)

However, the primary purpose of the General Assembly was the constitution and instruction of a special committee on Palestine. In this connection the assembly was faced with three different problems. It has to decide to establish a committee. This involved a debate on the need for a committee. Two

(6) New York Times, May 10, 1947, pp. 4 ff., p. 115,

(7) Jacob Robinson, Palestine and the United Nations, Public Affairs Press, 1947, p. 103. Also see New York Times, April 30, 1947, 1:8.

other problems followed logically, the composition of the committee and its terms of reference. Some representatives had doubts whether such a committee would be formed.

Mr. Jamali of Iraq claimed consistently that the problem of Palestine could be dealt with directly by the General Assembly without any previous preparation by a committee. He submitted that :

"If these principles were to be recommended by the Assembly the issue would be settled." He insisted, furthermore, that he does not believe there is a necessity for a committee at all.(8)

Everybody else stressed the necessity of the committee. Even Dr. Malik emphasized the fact that it is not even going to be Anglo-American Committee. It is going to be a United Nations Committee. Thus it was called a special committee; not because it was special in its character but because it was the first such inquiry undertaken by the United Nations.

On May 15, 1947, the General Assembly adopted by an affirmative vote of 46, with the five Arab States, Turkey, and Afghanistan in opposition, with the following resolution:

Whereas the General Assembly of the United Nations has been called into special session for the purpose of constitution and instructing a special committee to prepare for the consideration at the next regular session

(8) UN Official Records of the First Special Session of the General Assembly. Vol. 1, Plenary Meetings of the General Assembly, Seventy Seven Plenary meeting; April 28-May 15, 1947, p. 125.

of the Assembly to report on the question of Palestine. The General Assembly resolved that a special committee to be created. (9)

The Composition of the Committee

The idea of the Secretary General to have a committee of neutrals was endorsed by the United States and found favor among many other states. Others opposed it and a third group was in the middle of the road. Mr. Erikson, favoring neutrality, advanced the view that:

There is indeed a great need for impartial and international and authoritative committee. He was supported by Mr. Parodi who observed that the committee should be a special impartial committee. The idea of impartiality was endorsed by the representatives of Peru and Honduras.(10)

Mr. Austin maintained that the superior advantages are to have a neutral committee. Mr. Austin was supported by Sir Alexander Gadogan who expressed the view of his government in favor of a neutral committee. The full meaning of neutrality was expressed by Mr. Ponce (Ecuador) as he stated:

We do not wish to say that it is possible to assure absolute independence and impartiality, but we do mean that the countries which are not directly interested in the problem, the countries which are not under consideration and who do not have interests in this matter of a political, economic, strategic, or of another similar nature, will more closely approach impartiality and independent judgment than the others which are defending their rights or attempting to protect their interests.(11)

(9) UN Official Records of the First Special Session of the General Assembly; Vol. 11, Meeting 28 (doc. A/286, A/293) April 29, 1947, p. 11.

(10) Report to the General Assembly by the UN Special Committee on Palestine, p. 3.

Mr. Arce (Argentina) at the head of the second group, who opposed it, doubted that countries to which they were going to give such a delicate task would make great efforts and would be capable of showing neutrality in the matter. Mr. Kosanovic (Yugoslavia) attacked the idea of neutrality more drastically by saying:

Let us be completely sincere. Is it possible to be neutral in this problem? I do not think there is any neutrality here. Neutrality means no opinion. Dante, in the Inferno, puts a neutral opinion in the inferno. Those who are neither with God nor with the devil are in the inferno.(11)

He was supported by Mr. Belt (Guba) who maintained that it is very difficult to find neutrals in this question.

Between these two extremes was the view which held that it would be better to call a committee consisting of members of the United Nations other than the permanent members of the Security Council. Mr. Gromyko (Russia) rejected this idea.

I do not think the permanent members of the Security Council deserve such punishment. They do not deserve to be denied the rights possessed by all other countries.

Asaf Ali stating his views as an answer to Mr. Gromyko's statement said:

So far as the Soviet Union is concerned, by virtue of the fact that the Soviet is in close proximity

(11) UN Official Records of the first special session of the General Assembly, Vol. III, 48th Meeting (Document A/Ci/136) May 7, 1947.

to this particular area, and possible also interested in what developments are taking place there, both in the Arab World and in Palestine; it would be much the best for Russia to stand away.(12)

In regard to France Mr. Asaf said, "France was a mandatory in Syria -- it may be considered an interested party in some way or another."(13)

Sir Alexander Cadogan expressed his opinion as to the involved states to be out of the committee. He went further and opposed the inclusion of the Arab States on the committee. The result was an American proposal, which suggested a committee made with regard to geographical distribution and Mr. Austin named seven members.

The counter proposals of Argentina favored a membership of eleven and was supported by the representative of Australia. The delegation of Chile added two more governments and there were two candidates still missing from the proposed quota of eleven. As a result two ballots were taken by a show of hands, one on the question of who should represent the South Pacific group. The choice was between Australia and the Philippines. Australia won. India won, as a representative for Asia, against the Siam.

Thus the General Assembly on May 15, 1947, "resolved that the special committee was to be consisted of the representatives of Canada, Czechoslovakia, Iran, Netherlands,

(12) Ibid., p. 146.

(13) Ibid., p. 146.

Peru, Sweden, Uruguay (named by the United States), Guatemala, Yugoslavia, (named by Chile), India, and Australia.(14)

Analyzing the special committee, it consisted of two representatives of the British Commonwealth of nations (Australia and Canada). Two representatives of Eastern Europe who have more knowledge of the Jewish affairs than the other members (Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia). It had three Latin American countries: Guatemala, Peru and Paraguay. It also contained two Asiatic countries: India and Iran.(15)

The General Assembly adopted the passage which the representative of Venezuela states concerning the qualifications of the committee members.

The state members of the special committee, should appoint persons of high moral character and of recognized competence in international affairs, and that those appointed would act impartially and conscientiously in accordance with the purpose and principles of the charter of the United Nations.(16)

The terms of references adopted, on May 15, 1947, are wide and in the main general. "The committee is to prepare, not later than September 1st, a report for the next session of the Assembly on the question of Palestine, the future government of Palestine, and to make proposals for its solution.

(14) Report to the General Assembly by the UNSCOP, p. 3.
See New York Times, May 14, 1947, 1:1.

(15) New York Times, May 4, 1947, 4:3.

(16) UN Official Records (General Assembly), 57th Meeting, op. cit., May 13, 1947, p. 333.

It was given the widest powers to ascertain and record facts and investigate all questions and issues relevant to the problem of Palestine.(17)

It was to conduct investigations in Palestine and wherever it may deem useful. It was to receive and examine oral and written evidences, whichever it may consider appropriate in each case from the mandatory power, from representatives of the population of Palestine, and from governments and such organizations and individuals as it may think necessary. It was to give the most careful consideration of the religious interests in Palestine of Islam, Judaism, and Christianity.

Payment of expenses: The General Assembly authorized the Secretary General to:

"reimburse travel and subsistence expenses of a representative and an alternate representative from each government represented on the special committee, on such basis and in such form as he may determine most appropriate in the circumstances." The allowance was fixed at twenty dollars.(18)

Membership of the Committee and Secretariat

Australia	Mr. J. D. L. Hood, Delegate. Mr. S. L. Atyeo, Alternate.
Canada	Justice I. C. Rand, Delegate. Mr. Leon Mayrand, Alternate.
Czechoslovakia	Mr. Karel Lisicky, Delegate. Dr. Richard Pech, Alternate.

(17) Report to the General Assembly, op. cit., p. 2.

(18) Op. cit., UN Official Records, Vol. 1, Plenary Meeting of the Second Session, No. 77, May 14, 1947, p. 124.

Guatemala	H. E. Dr. Jorge Garcia Granados, Delegate Mr. E. Z. Gonzales, Alternate
India	Sir Abdur Rahman, Delegate. Mr. Venkata Viswanathan, Alternate. Mr. H. Dayal, Second Alternate.
Iran	H. E. Mr. Nasrollah Entezam, Delegate. Dr. Ali Ardalan, Alternate.
Netherlands	Dr. N. S. Blom, Delegate. Mr. A. I. Spits, Alternate.
Peru	H. E. Dr. Alberto Ullica, Delegate. H. E. Dr. Arturo Garcia Salazar, Alternate.
Sweden	Justice Emil Sandstrom, Delegate. Dr. Paul Mohn, Alternate.
Uruguay	Professor Enrique Rodriques Fabregate, Delegate. Mr. Secco Ellauri, Alternate.
Yugoslavia	Mr. Vladimir Simic, Delegate. Dr. Jose Brilej, Alternate.(19)

Four of the representatives were jurists with a background of government representation. Six of the representatives had a background of long-standing diplomatic services and government representation. One was a professor with a background of government representation.

Chairmanship and the Working-groups

On may 26, 1947, the special committee on Palestine held its first meeting at Lake Success. This was called to order and presided over by the Secretary General of the United Nations who welcomed the committee members and handed them the

(19) Ibid., p. 123.

See also Report to the General Assembly, op. cit., p. 4.

first three volumes of the working documents on Palestine prepared by the secretariat.

At the same meeting the committee exchanged many points of view on its future work. After a long discussion it was agreed to create a Preparatory Working Group which should produce some suggestions on various organizational matters for the consideration of the committee.

The working group held three meetings at the Empire State Building. At the second meeting of the special committee, at Lake Success, it presented what suggestions she had already done. At this meeting they made the following decisions:

- (1) It was agreed to postpone until arrival in Palestine any discussion of communications from displaced persons requesting that the committee visit assembly centers of Europe.
- (2) A tentative work plan was adopted, in the sense that, upon its arrival in Palestine, the committee should first, ask the government of Palestine to furnish factual information; second, request the Arab and Jewish Liaison officers to prevent observations on this statement; third, make a brief survey of the country, and fourth conduct hearings.(20)

Work of the Committee in Palestine

On June 14, and 15, 1947, the committee arrived in Palestine; on the 16th it met in Jerusalem at the Y. M. C. A. The Jewish Agency requested that permanent liaison officers should be attached to the committee. The committee to avoid

(20) Op. cit., Report to the General Assembly, p. 5.

general problems with the Arabs, the mandatory government, and the Jewish Agency, informed the said parties that they may appoint liaison officers to the committee who shall supply such information or render other assistance as the committee may require. The liaison officers may present at the discretion of the committee such information as they think advisable.

These liaisons could not and would not sit with the committee as a member of the committee. They could not question in meetings involving hearings except with permission. They could not be entitled to be present at the deliberation of the committee or in the private discussions between members.

On the arrival in Palestine the committee established four sub-committees for consideration of specific problems.

- (1) Sub-committee I was established for the purpose of drawing up an itinerary for the committee.
- (2) Sub-committee II was established to deal with requests by organizations or individuals for hearing.
- (3) Sub-committee III was appointed later, for the purpose of visiting displaced persons camps.
- (4) Sub-committee IV was constituted to study the questions of religious interests in the Holy Land.

Internal Procedure

The special committee decided its own procedure. All committee documents were reproduced by the secretariat and distributed by the documents office. Verbatim minutes of

all the committee hearings were taken and were circulated to the members on their request. Summary records were kept of the committee meetings. The committee decided that:

Copies of all documents, other than confidential ones, were to be supplied to the three parties; the mandatory power, the Arab Higher Committee, and the Jewish Agency for Palestine. (21)

Decisions were taken by a majority vote. Owing to the complexity of the problem under investigation, appeals to the vote were frequent.

The meetings of the committee were held in public, unless the committee decided otherwise. Many times the committee conducted its meetings in private to prevent harmful publicity, delay, or embarrassment to its members. From May 26, 1944 to August 31, 1947, the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine held 13 public and 38 private meetings.

The committee had its own press officers. They were authorized to give the press verbal briefings of the meetings, but not without the previous approval of the chairman. The press officers used to obtain the approval of the committee at the end of every meeting, before giving briefings.

To arrive at an understanding of the issue involved in the Palestine problem the committee adopted a two-fold method of operation. First, by conducting a survey of the land, its people and their aspirations, the social, economic, and religious systems. The second method of operation was to investigate

(21) Op. cit., Report to the General Assembly, p. 17.

the parties and their views on the problem of Palestine. This was carried out by means of oral hearings and written testimony. The committee had many informal contacts with the heads of the religious men, and of the man-in-the-street.*

The committee at Jerusalem heard 33 individuals, representing 13 political and religious organizations. It heard six representatives of the Government of Palestine. As I stated before, in Beirut the committee heard representatives of the Arab States in ten meetings, eight private and two public.

There were many channels through which the committee got the factual information of the problem; first through oral evidence. The practice was that the party gave factual information and was asked factual questions by the members of the committee. Second was written testimony. The Government of Palestine, and the Jewish Agency submitted a big supply of evidence which included background documents, factual statements, and maps. A large number of written statements were also submitted by organizations and individuals who had not requested or had not been granted a hearing.

There was a third group of materials called informal evidence. The committee took all possible steps to overcome every disability in order to make a successful work.

* See map on next page.

It maintained many informal contacts with political and religious leaders, with the members of the government, with members of illegal organizations, and with the man-in-the-street.(22)

(22) Op. cit., Report to the General Assembly, p. 22.

CHAPTER II
THE CASE AND THE JURY

Before the case is carried to the court the judges have to study the case many times before they face it. The members of the committee, as well as every one who got acquainted with it, were puzzled by the nature of the problem and how it developed.

The General Assembly had been struck too, by the complexity of the problem. Here are some of their declarations and their question-mark statements. Mr. Qua Tai Chi stated:

I am afraid that no parliament of man, no statement, no legal formula, no historical equation, no political and economic program can singly or altogether by themselves solve the problem.(1)

Mr. Gromyko called it "an acute question and political problem." For Mr. Austin, "it is a very grave problem." Mr. Van Raijen spoke of it as "painful and unfortunately complicated." Mr. Asaf Ali declared:

Palestine has become the acid test of human conscience. The United Nations will find that upon their decision will depend the future of humanity, whether humanity is going to proceed by peaceful means or whether humanity is going to be torn to pieces. If a wrong decision flows from this assembly, you may take it from me that the world shall be cut in twain and there shall be no peace upon earth.(2)

(1) Op. cit., Report to the General Assembly, p. 199.

(2) Ibid., p. 200.

See also: Official Records of the First Special Session of the General Assembly, Vol. 1, Seventy Nine Plenary Meeting, May 15, 1947, p. 126.

The president, Mr. Aranaha, spoke of it as a subject of the most controversial nature. He came to the conclusion that:

The problem of Palestine is one of the most difficult problems with which anybody can be faced. The only road left open to us now is to meet this challenge, and we have to meet it fully, if we are to survive.(3)

I. The Arab Case Before the Committee

The basic approach of the Arab delegations and States to the problem was that the rights of the Arabs are derived from actual and long-standing possession (1,300 years) and rests upon the strongest human foundation. These are what they call "Natural Rights".

Is a claim based on possession established 2,000 years ago a valid one? No, said Mr. Jamali. If so Mexico would be justified in claiming large areas of the United States. Spain could claim Mexico and the Arabs would have a valid title to Spain, which they ruled longer than the Jews ruled Palestine.

The Arab delegates sought strenuously to destroy the Jewish case. They emphasized that the small land of Palestine is an integral part of the Arab World. The traditions and culture are of Arab quality and character. Mr. Asaf Ali stated

(3) Op. cit., Report to the General Assembly, p. 200.

the same idea by saying, "Palestine undoubtedly is an integral part of Arabia.(4)

Thus the argument based on "historical connection" is not only flimsy but dangerous. Ancestral possession in ancient times is not a basis for a sound case.

In addition to those "natural rights", the Arabs had acquired specific political rights derived from the Sharif Hussein's compact with Great Britain and the help they gave her. The thesis that Palestine west of the Jordan was excluded from the British pledges can no longer be maintained. The text now available shows that Sharif Hussein was given a general promise relating to its independence in the McMahon letters of 1915, and a specific promise securing the political and economic freedom of its Arab population.(5) In spite of the circulation of these official letters in the Arab land, the McMahon correspondence had remained hidden from public knowledge in England until 1939. As for Hogarty's message and the memorial, they lie buried in the White Hall in a sea of oblivion.(6)

Once more the Arab representatives attacked the mandate,

(4) Ibid.

(5) See Appendix I

(6) See Appendix in Report to the General Assembly.

and its validity. Mr. Jamali stated:

The whole issue of Palestine is one of conflict principles derived from expediency, power of politics and local interest. I believe that the principles on which the Jewish claim is based are invalid as being in contradiction with the Charter of the United Nations, the Government of the League of Nations and the mandate.(7)

As to its contradiction to the United Nations Charter, Mr. Jamali meant that the purpose of that organization is to maintain peace, prevent aggression, and develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples. Why should self-determination be granted freely to other peoples and not the Arabs? Why should the people of Palestine, who were ninety percent Arabs and ten percent Jews (1914-1918), be asked to live indefinitely in a condition of political subjection for the sake of the minority who had not been asked to come to the country, and were not wanted? Why should Arabs of Palestine be expected to wait patiently and subserviently through the years until the minority had become, by force and shedding of blood, the majority? This is slavery forever for the Arab.

Mr. M. Hassan (Egypt) stated before the committee that England had no legal right to proclaim the Balfour Declaration

(7) UN Official Records of the First Special Session of the General Assembly, Vol. II, April 29-May 7, 1947, Twenty-eighth Meeting, Document A Bur/78, p. 27.

and give away Palestine over the heads of its inhabitants. She gave something she did not own, or possess. At the time of the Declaration, Palestine was not yet in their hands. Mr. Kaltan demanded that "an inquiry be made into the legality, validity and ethics of this document." (8)

Mr. Asaf Ali sought to dismiss the Balfour Declaration as a document, which was made under the stress of the great war. He suggested the following:

That the special committee look into it to see whether the terms of the mandate are consistent with Article 22 of the Covenant. It is the root of and the very reason for all the troubles. (9)

In contesting the argument that the mandate was sanctioned by the League of Nations, Mr. Jamali said:

The answer to that is that it was one of the mistakes of the League, which was under the control of the Allies. The League must have passed it without adequate study or perhaps without anticipation of the consequences. Even if the members who passed the terms of the mandate did so with good intention, experience proved that they were wrong, just as the Balfour Declaration itself was wrong. (10)

On four different occasions before the committee, Arab speakers protested against continued Jewish immigration into Palestine. They claimed that the right of Jews to immigrate

(8) UN Official Records of the General Assembly, Vol. III, Document A/C (136) Meeting 52, May 9, 1947, p. 193.

(9) UN General Assembly Special Session, op. cit., p. 194.

(10) UN Official Records of the First Special Session of the General Assembly, Vol II, April 29 - May 7, 1947, Twenty-eight meeting, Document A/BUR/78, p. 15.

into Palestine is denied by the Charter of the United Nations and the resolution of the General Assembly of December, 15, 1945. The Arab spokesmen contend further that there is no more room in Palestine for large scale immigration. They point to the fact that the density of the country's population is now 176 persons to the square mile, as compared with 46 in the United States, 22 in Russia, 13 in Brazil and 3 in Canada. The Palestine question is not a purely humanitarian one. It is primarily political. It is not whether homeless Jews should be allowed a refuge in Palestine. It is whether they should rule it; that is the main issue. Mr. Khouri made the following statement:

We do not understand why the displaced persons of Europe, who are searching to resettle somewhere in the world, should go to Palestine. The United Nations in the General Assembly had a resolution as the last session in October clearly stated that the non-self governing territories could not be the place for sending new displaced persons without the consent of the population of those countries.(11)

Mr. Khouri's view, supported by Mohnond Hassain Pasha, of the refugee problem in Europe as the province exclusively of the International Refugee organization and, therefore, outside the jurisdiction of the special committee on Palestine.(12)

(11) Ibid., p. 284.

(12) The United Nations World, Vol. I., No. 9, Oct. 1944.

The Arabs presented a case not only against the Jews, but also against Great Britain. The British Government has never accepted the Arab case. How many lives were lost as a result of the policy of enforcing the mandate and how much money has been spent on police posts and fortresses as compared with schools and hospitals? David Hopper states:

Forty percent of the Arab applicants for admission to schools were turned away for lack of space. The special committee on Palestine reported in 1947 that the Government System of Public Education covers only 57 percent of Arab boys and 23 percent of the girls of school age.(13)

Mr. Khouri, though he had much to say, confined himself only to this:

I am not going to discuss the administration in Palestine during the mandate. All the taxation and money collected there from the population was spent in establishing or promoting the Jewish National Home; it is as if the Arabs of Palestine were asked to help in digging their graves with their own hands.(14)

Religious groups also appeared before the special committee and defended the Arab case. They declared that their religious attachment of Palestine is more extensive and deeper than that of the Jews.

Some Christian supporters of Zionism have approached the subject from another angle. They base their stand on the

(13) Frank C. Sakran, Palestine Dilemma, (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1948), p. 120.

(14) UN Official Records of the first special session of the General Assembly, Vol. I, Plenary Meeting 78, May 14, 1947, p. 144.

promise to Abraham that his seed shall inherit the land of Canaan. Thus it belongs to them and sooner or later they have to come back to it. While others stated that, according to the Bible, God's promise to Abraham was fulfilled 3,000 years ago when the Jews occupied and ruled Palestine. They later lost it because of their transgression and since they rejected Christ as their Messiah, can no longer be considered by Christians as the heirs of Abraham. The Bible says:

If ye be Christ's, then are ye Abraham's seed, and heirs according to the promise. There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there is neither male nor female, for ye are all one in Christ Jesus. (15)

Mohammedan supporters of the Arab case also spoke of Islam's teachings as similar to those of Christianity. Mohammed, their prophet, taught that because of their failure to heed the message of the prophets, including those of Jesus and of himself, the Jews forfeited any claim to God's favor despite their descent from Abraham:

Verily the men who are the nearest of kin to Abraham, are they who follow him; and his prophet, and they who believe on him; God is the patron of the faithful. (16)

(15) Galatians 3:28, 29.

(16) The Koran: The family of Imran.

Arab spokesmen have also cited the following principles of American Policy outlined by President Truman in a speech delivered on October 1945.

We believe in the eventual return to sovereign rights and self-government to all peoples who have been deprived of them by force. We shall approve of no territorial changes in any friendly part of the world unless they accord with the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned. We believe that all people who are prepared for self-government should be permitted to choose their own form of government by their own freely expressed choice, without interference from any foreign source. That is true in Europe, in Asia, in Africa, as well as in the Western Hemisphere. (17)

It is not an exaggeration to say that the views expressed by Gandhi reflect the attitude of the Asian people and voice their feeling most truly when he said:

Palestine belongs to the Arabs in the same sense that England belongs to the English or France to the French. It is wrong and inhuman to impose the Jews on the Arabs. What is going on in Palestine today can't be justified by any morale code of conduct. Surely it would be a crime against humanity to reduce the proud Arabs so that Palestine can be restored to the Jews partly or wholly as their national home. The root cause would be to insist on a just treatment of Jews wherever they are born and bred. (18)

Freya Stark, a Britisher, writes:

I have always held that force is a monstrous thing to use against people long settled on its land to induce it to accept immigration. If the arrival are angels from heaven, it makes no difference: the inhabitation of

(17) Navy Day Speech, President Truman Foreign Policy, Congressional Digest, Background, Dept. of Armed Forces, American Foreign and Military policies, Washington, Oct. 26, 1945, p. 294.

(18) United Asia, International Monthly of Asian Affairs, 1948, p. 252.

a land for two thousand years gives one a right to open or close the door, whether it be Italians in Abyssian or Zionists in Palestine. The Jews have already admitted close upon half a million Jewish immigrants within the last 25 years. The Arabs number two thirds, and the Jews one third. Thus that in proportion of population the Jewish immigration would correspond to 45 million in the United States. If America had admitted 45 million Jews or Gentiles or indeed angels, all in one lump in less than 30 years, and it was proposed still to coerce her to keep her door open, it is easy to imagine what her reaction would be. (19)

II. The Jewish Case before the Committee

The Jewish case as a whole was presented by three spokesmen of the Jewish Agency (Dr. Silver, Mr. Shertok, Mr. Cussion). Many delegates however made statements of understanding and sympathy for the Jews but nobody identified himself with the cause in the manner in which the Arab speakers identified themselves with the cause of the Palestinian Arabs.

The Jewish spokesmen demanded the opening of Palestine to unrestricted Jewish immigration and the establishment of a Jewish State. The statement, "Palestine belongs to the Jews," was based on :

- (1) The historical connection.
- (2) Their religious attachment to it.
- (3) The Balfour Declaration and the mandate.

Dr. Silver argued:

The Jewish case is, in the first place a legal one, based on the Balfour Declaration. The Balfour Declaration which was issued by His Majesty's Government as a declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist

(19) Frank Sakran, Palestine Dilemma, op. cit., p. 212; from Arab Island, pp. 69, 110.

aspiration. His Majesty's Government views with favor the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people. The mandate in its preamble, recognized the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and the grounds for reconstituting their national home in the country. Generations ago the international community of the world, of which the United Nations today is the political and spiritual heir, decreed that the Jewish people shall be given the right long denied and the opportunity to reconstitute their national home in Palestine. That national home is still in the making. It has not yet been fully established, no international community has cancelled, or even questioned that right.(20)

Dr. Silver accused the English Government for failing to fulfill her promise. He said:

The mandatory power which was entrusted with the obligation to safeguard the opportunity for the continuous growth and development of the Jewish National Home has unfortunately in recent years grievously interfered with an circumscribed it. That opportunity must now be fully restored.(21)

Mr. Shertok demanded and argued, about the historical connection of the Jews in Palestine, stating:

It may sound quite plausible to argue that if the right of the Jews to return to Palestine is admitted on the ground of ancient history, then the whole map of the world would have to be remade and chaos would ensue. But does that question really arise? Do the descendants of the Romans, for example, claim entry into England? Do they need England? Does their future, their very existence, depend on settling there? (22)

(20) UN Official Records of the First Special Session of the General Assembly, Vol. III, Main Committees, 50th Meeting, (Document A/C1/136) May 8, 1947, p. 109-110.
New York Times (May 11, 1947, IV. 1:2.)

(21) Ibid., p. 110-111.

(22) UN Official Records of the First Special Session of the General Assembly, Vol. III, 54th Meeting (Document A/C1/136) May 12, 1947, p. 257.

Then Mr. Shertok applied the same questions to the Arab delegates:

Do the Arabs for that matter press to return to Andalusia in Spain? Is it a matter of life or death for them? No... the analogy is fallacious and misleading.

The Jews as a homeless people should have a home and their historical connection to Palestine is a great historic phenomenon, a unique and an international affair. The great historic phenomenon of the Jewish return to Palestine is unique because the position of the Jewish people as a homeless people, and yet attached with an unbreakable tenacity to its birthplace. It is that phenomenon that has made the problem of Palestine an issue in international affairs, and no similiar issue has ever arisen. (23)

Mr. Ben Goroun, concerning the Jewish situation in Palestine, dealt with three aspects: the regeneration of the Jewish nation, the achievement of the Jews in Palestine and re-settlement; using the following language he said:

In Palestine you are faced not merely with a large and growing number of Jews, but with a distinct Jewish Nation. In Palestine there is a new and unique phenomenon, a Jewish Nation, with all attributes, characteristic resources, and aspirations of nationhood. Palestine, was in the course of centuries conquered and invaded by many alien peoples, but none of them ever identified its national fate with it. (24)

Speaking about the achievement of the Jews in the work of reconstruction he stated:

The growth of this nation and its work of reconstruction must not and cannot be arrested, and this for two reasons. One is the existence of large numbers of homeless Jews, for whom there is no other salvation except in their own national home. The second is that

(23) Ibid., p. 252.

(24) Ibid., p. 274.

more than two-thirds of the land of Palestine is still waste and uncultivated.

We are not like our Arab neighbors, in possession of vast underpopulated territories; like Iraq, Arabia, and Syria. We must therefore make use of every bit of every free land in our country, even desert land.(25)

The connection of the Jewish immigration with the Palestine problem was presented by Mr. Shertok. He emphasized the fact that:

The need for immigration cannot be ignored. To treat the issue of Palestine in isolation from the immigration issue would make as much sense as to study the beating of a heart in disregard of blood circulation. The Jewish immigrants appealed to the world to say that, they form part of a people which has a national home will of its own. They want to go to the only country where they will feel at home, both individually and collectively.(26)

Ben Goroun, answering the representative of Poland who asked, was there any cooperation between the Arab and Jews, stated:

Yes, there has been on both sides. Arabs and Jews have cooperated successfully in the wide and varied fields of municipal, commercial, and labor affairs.(27)

I can affirm that there is nothing inherent in the nature of either the native Arab or the immigrant Jew which prevents friendly cooperation. On the contrary considering the admitted great difference of background, they mix remarkably well. We are going to Palestine not to fight the Arab World, but to live at peace with it.(28)

The Jewish spokesmen attacked the mandatory government and the White Paper, after Sir Alexander Cadogan had stated

(25) Ibid., p. 274-275.

(26) Ibid., p. 254-55.

(27) They did not find encouragement or help from the mandatory who kept them apart.

(28) Ibid., p. 257.

that the British Government tried for years to settle the problems of Palestine and had failed and that, therefore, it had brought the problem to the United Nations. Mr. Ben Goroun retorts to this:

The mandatory power was charged by the League of Nations with the carrying out of a definite settlement. The Balfour Declaration was approved by the League of Nations and made international law. The settlement was the restoration of Palestine to the Jews. England had failed to fulfill that settlement. The failure became manifest with introduction of a policy set forth in the White Paper of 1939, which violated the most essential terms of the mandate and vitiated its entire purpose.

The White Paper was condemned by the League, and denounced by the most eminent political leaders of the United Kingdom itself. The Jews all over the world were disappointed. The White Paper Policy is responsible for the misery and deaths of a large number of Jews and for the cruel acts of expulsion of Jewish refugees. It is responsible for establishing in Palestine a police state without parallel in the civilized world. This is the real nature of the failure of the mandatory power. (29)

Dr. Silver went further than that by condemning the mandatory and stressed that the mandate was without international supervision.

The administration of Palestine has, since the outbreak of the war, been conducted by the mandatory power as if it were vested with the sovereignty of Palestine, whereas it is assumed to administer that country, of which it was not the sovereign, as a trustee for carrying out the purposes of the mandate which clearly defined its rights and its obligations. (30)

The whole argument revolved around the fulfillment of

(29) Ibid., p. 273-274.

(30) Ibid., p. 108.

the declaration promising a national home for the Jews.

Mr. Shertok ended the Jewish case with a strong appeal to the family of Nations, that: there should be an Israel State with free immigration and full independence. "For its attainment we appeal for the assistance of the entire family of nations."

Summary of Jewish and Arab Arguments

The summary of arguments gleaned from the debate before the committee and supplemented from other sources presented here for both the Arab and Zionist sides of the Palestine problem is not intended to exhaust all that might be said on behalf of either faction. It is merely a survey of some of the main contentions advanced by either side to justify the stands they have taken.

The arguments of each side, in parallel columns, follow:

Zionist

Arab

- | | |
|--|--|
| <p>1. Arguing from history, the Zionists lay claim to Palestine on the basis that they occupied Palestine for many centuries, as witnessed by the Old Testament, and there they built a flourishing Hebrew kingdom. After the destruction of Jerusalem in the first century A.D. and the subsequent dispersion of the Jews, some Jews still remained in Palestine. For this reason it is just to reconstitute the Jewish state in Palestine.</p> | <p>1. Arguing historically, the Arabs of Palestine claim to be descendants, in part at least, of the original inhabitants of Palestine. Partly they are descendants of the Arab conquerors of the 7th century A.D. The Hebrews were invaders from the outside and for the last 2,000 years there has been no Jewish state in Palestine and no Jewish majority. It is not reasonable to remake the map in accordance with a situation of 2,000 years ago.</p> |
| <p>2. Palestine is a holy land to the Jews, the home of their ancient prophets and temple, is closely connected with the symbols and practices of the Jewish religion and has been the object of their hopes throughout the ages. As the Jew's unique religious home, they have a right to return to Palestine.</p> | <p>2. Palestine is also a holy land to the Christians and is the second holy land of the Moslems. Jerusalem is Islam's third holiest city. The religious nostalgia of the Jews does not confer political rights. Most Jews now returning to Palestine are religiously inspired but are animated by aggressive political nationalism.</p> |

ZionistArab

3. The Balfour Declaration of 1917 promised the Zionists a "national home" in Palestine. Prominent British leaders understood that this meant, in time, a Jewish state approved by the United States and the League of Nations.
4. The Jews have brought western civilization to Palestine. Astounding agricultural and industrial progress has been made. Jewish immigration has raised the low Arab standard of living and improved health, hospital, and other services for the benefit of Jews and Arabs alike. The Arab economy is feudalistic. By means of irrigation etc., Palestine could support millions of additional people -- both immigrants and natives. The White Paper of 1939 unjustly restricts Jewish acquisition of property.
5. The Jews have suffered unspeakable persecution in Europe and all considerations of humanitarian justice demand that the Jews be permitted to go to Palestine, a land that has been promised them under international law. Most Jewish refugees would
3. A "national home" in Palestine does not mean a Jewish state. The official British White Papers of 1922 and 1939 confirm this. The Balfour Declaration contradicts the McMahon pledges. Balfour promised to give away something that was not his to give. The Arabs of Palestine are not claiming their country on pledges made to them, for it belongs to them. Nor are the Arabs claiming their independence on assurances; they are entitled to such independence as their natural and inalienable right.
4. The prosperity of the Jewish colonies in Palestine is artificial because it is supported strongly by foreign capital. At one time the Arabs were the most cultured people on earth. After four centuries of Ottoman rule, it was natural their economy should be depressed. The other independent Arab states have made remarkable progress on their own initiative. It is unfair that property acquired by the Jewish Agency should be made inalienable and that Arab labor should be disbarred from it.
5. The Arabs pity the sad plight of the Jews but, after all, the Arabs were not responsible for bringing about that sad situation. Palestine, a small, arid country, cannot solve the Jewish refugee problem, which must be approached on a world scale.

ZionistArab

- rather go to Palestine than : At the same proportionate
any other place. Nowhere else : rate of Jewish immigration
do Jews have the same oppor- : into Palestine, the United
tunity to rebuild their lives. : States would have taken in
Law and justice demand that : over 40 million immigrants.
the world answer the Zionist : Let the rest of the world
plea. : assume its share of the
: refugee burden.
6. The League of Nations : 6. As inhabitants of the
mandate recognized "the his- : land for centuries, the
torical connection of the : Arabs have a right to Pal-
Jewish people with Pales- : estine on the basis of self-
tine. : determination of peoples.
7. Political Zionism is : 7. Many Jews do not support
supported by an overwhelming : Zionism; many others are in-
majority of Jews, and by many : terested only in cultural or
Christian leaders, especially : religious Zionism. The western
in the United States and Great : democracies have been ignor-
Britain. : nant of the case.
8. The Jews require a state : 8. The concessions of the 1939
in Palestine because the : White Paper merely recognized
British, as the governing : Arab rights in Palestine. The
authority, have made conces- : British promise to stop immi-
sions to the Arabs for stra- : gration after five years has
tegic, political and other : been broken and now 100,000
reasons. : new immigrants are being rec-
: commended.
9. The establishment of a : 9. Establishment of a Jewish
Jewish state in Palestine : state might lead to war be-
would help solve the Jewish : tween Arabs and Jews. The Jews
minority problem at the same : are not a nation but citizens
time. Jews would no longer be : of many countries who profess
a perpetual minority group : the same religion. Many Jewish
but would have a government : citizens of other countries
which could defend Jewish : are opposed to political Zion-
rights before the internat- : ism because they fear it may
tional councils of the world. : effect their political status.
All this would not prejudice :
the rights of Jewish citizens :
of other countries.

ZionistArab

10. The Jews must attain a majority in Palestine because only thus can they cast off permanently that minority ghetto status that has plagued them for centuries. An Arab guarantee of their minority rights would not be sufficient.
11. The Arabs have great stretches of territory and many millions of people.
12. The United States government has repeatedly expressed sympathy for Jewish aspirations in Palestine. President Roosevelt agreed to work for a Jewish commonwealth in Palestine.
13. The Arabs have accepted the 600,000 Jews in Palestine as a "Fait accompli"; They would probably accept a Jewish state if England and the United States insisted upon it. The Arab League is too weak to wage an effective war against the western democracies. The Arab states need Anglo-American friendship in the Near East because of the threat of Russia.
14. Continued Jewish immigration into Palestine is required if the Zionists are to construct the Jewish states which they claim has been promised to them.
10. The Jews have no right to obtain control over the Arabs in their own country. The Arabs can be trusted to guarantee Jewish rights: a Moslem family, for example, has been entrusted by the Christians for many years with the keys of the Holy Sepulchre.
11. Most of the Arab world is desert. Would the United States, for example, be willing to give up one of its small states upon the order of a foreign power?
12. The United States government has been influenced by American Jewish voters in its policy towards Palestine. President Roosevelt promised to take no action in Palestine hostile to the Arabs.
13. A Jewish state in Palestine would meet the combined resistance of the Arab League. If England and America support Zionist aims, oil concessions might be withdrawn. Some Arabs have hinted that Russian support may be called in if England and the United States press the Zionist cause too far.
14. Even with Jewish immigration limited only by economic capacity, they may never obtain a majority in Palestine because of the rapid natural increase of the

: Arab population.(31)
:

The arguments for each side in the Palestine problem could be extended indefinitely. Those just listed, however, may be accepted as representative of the difficulty involved in reaching a workable solution. Since that fateful day in 1917 when Mr. Balfour extended his promise to the Zionists, there have been few.

Proposals Propounded in the Committee Hearing for the Solution of the Problem

A. Jewish proposals:

1. Most Jewish organizations in Palestine and abroad which submitted written or oral statements to the committee agreed with the Jewish Agency in demanding Palestine for the creation of a Jewish State. The opposition to the creation of a Jewish State is represented by a minority.

2. The Ihu (union) Association and the Hashemer Worker's Party were in favor of a bi-national state in which the two (Arab and Jews) communities would have equal status and political power.

(31) Charles R. Gellennr, The Palestine Problem, The Library of Congress, Legislative Reference Service, Pub. Affairs Bulletin, No. 50, Washington D.C., March 1947, pp. 176-179.

Report to the Gen. Assembly, The UN Special Committee on Palestine, His Majesty's Stationary Office, London, 1947, pp. 47-56.

The Future of Palestine, Arab Office, Imperial Central, Geneva, 1947, p. 106.

Samy El Midany, International Relations(Arabic), (Damascus: Syrian University Press, 1938), p. 2-23.

3. The Communist Party proposes a democratic Arab-Jewish State, which might be bi-national or federative.

4. The council for Judaism voiced opposition to Zionism, and opposed the establishment of a Jewish State.

5. The Jewish Agency: A solution to ensure large scale immigration and settlement and leads without delay to the establishment of the Jewish State.

B. Arab proposals:

The representatives of the Arab States put forward much the same constitutional proposals for the future of Palestine.

1. Palestine should be a unitary state, with a democratic constitution and an elected legislative assembly.

2. Civil rights provided for all citizens.

3. Protection of religious and cultural rights of the Jewish community.

4. Strict prohibition of Jewish immigration.

Here we see two different solutions with no cooperation from either side, thus the special committee rejected such solutions.

Palestinian Arabs Boycott of the Committee During the Hearing in Palestine.

The United Nations Special Committee on Palestine was faced with the non-cooperation of the Palestinian Arabs.

This in fact effected the entire work of the committee.

On June 13, 1947, the Arab Higher Committee conveyed an official statement of their decision to abstain from collaboration in the work of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine.(32)

Since the success of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine depended upon the co-operation of the parties (Arabs and Jews), the committee did her best to overcome this disability. Mr. Sandstrom (chairman) made many appeals by radio and local press for the full co-operation of all parties.

On June 23, the committee addressed a letter directly to the Arab Higher Committee inviting them for full co-operation. In answer the Arab Higher Committee stated:

The Arab Higher Committee found no reason to reverse its previous decision.(33)

To balance the absence of the Arabs, the committee took special account of Arab residential, industrial, agricultural and religious areas.

The committee adopted another procedure, at a later

(32) Report to the General Assembly, United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, England Office, 1947, p. 8.

United Nations Year Book, 1946-47, Department of Public Information, United Nations, Lake Success, New York, p. 304.

(33) Report to the General Assembly, op. cit., p. 8.

stage of its work, to invite the neighboring Arab States to express their views on the question of Palestine. Letters were addressed to Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Trans-Jordan. Acceptance followed, with the exception of Trans-Jordan.

King Abdullah had his own views of wanting the Arab State in Palestine to be added to Trans-Jordan. To obtain King Abdullah's views and attitude, the chairman and some members of the committee went to Amman for a private visit to his majesty's representative. All this showed the consistent efforts of the committee to obtain all Arab view points on the future government of Palestine.

CHAPTER III
THE COMMITTEE AND THE DECISION

To prepare the report the chairman, Mr. Sandstrom, and two members presented suggestions as to a working program of the committee for the preparation of the committee at Geneva. The presentation of this suggestion by the chairman was at the 42nd meeting. After an informal consultation, they adopted a memorandum on the future work-program of the committee. It was approved by the committee. It was also suggested that another informal memoranda be submitted by delegates or members of the Secretariat.

After many informal discussions two proposals had emerged. The first was Federal State Constitutional plan, favored by three members (India, Iran, and Yugoslavia). Seven members voted against this. The second plan was partition with an economic union. Three members voted against this. The representative of Australia did not vote.

Finally at the 52nd meeting on August 31, 1947, the representatives signed the approved text of the report and the covering letter to the Secretary General. The main recommendations submitted were as follows:

I. Recommendations Approved Unanimously

The committee unanimously approved eleven recommendations to the General Assembly:

1. "Termination of the mandate. Arabs and Jews are

in full accord with that.

2. Independence shall be granted in Palestine at the earliest possible date as the people of Palestine are sufficiently advanced to govern themselves.
3. There shall be a transitional period preceding the grant of independence, which shall be as short as possible.
4. During the transitional period the authority entrusted with the task of administering Palestine and preparing it for independence shall be responsible to the United Nations.
5. The sacred character of the Holy places.
6. The General Assembly will undertake immediately an international arrangement whereby the problem of the distressed European Jews will be dealt with.
7. Full protection for the rights and interests of minorities.
8. It shall be required that the two parties (Arabs and Jews) have peaceful relations.
9. Economic unity. The preservation of a suitable measure of economic unity in Palestine, under any type of solution, is of utmost importance to the future standards of public services, the standards of life of its people and the development of the country.
10. States whose nationals have in the past enjoyed in Palestine the privileges and immunities of foreigners will have the right to the re-establishment of such privileges and immunities in an independent Palestine.
11. The General Assembly shall call on the peoples of Palestine to extend their fullest cooperation to the United Nations in settling the problem and ending the acts of violence which have for too long beset that country.(1)

(1) Ibid., p. 66-70; New York Times, Dec. 6, 1947; See map.

11. Recommendations approved by a substantial majority.

A. Partition and the Economic Union*

In the course of the 47th meeting of the committee on August 27, 1947, seven members of the committee (Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, and Uruguay) expressed themselves by recorded vote in favor of the plan of partition with the Economic Union. It consists of the following parts:

1. "Partition with the Economic Union.
2. Boundaries.
3. City of Jerusalem."(2)

Only by means of partition, says the majority group, can the conflicting parties find a way to solve the problem. The reasons they gave for this are as follows:

1. The partition solution provides that finality which is a most urgent need in the solution. Every other proposed solution would tend to induce the two parties to seek modification in their favour by means of persistent pressure. The grant of independence to both States, however, would remove the basis for such efforts.

2. Partition is based on a realistic appraisal of the actual Arab-Jewish relations in Palestine. Full political co-operation would be indispensable to the effective functioning of any single state scheme, such as the federal State

(2) Ibid., p. 73.

proposal, except in those cases which frankly envisage an Arab or a Jewish dominated State.

3. Partition is the only means available by which political and economic responsibility can be placed squarely on both Arabs and Jews, with the prospective result that confronted with responsibility for bearing fully the consequences of their own actions, a new and important element of political amelioration will be introduced. In the proposed federal State solution this factor would be lacking.

4. Jewish immigration is the central issue in Palestine today and is the one factor, above all others, that rules out the necessary cooperation between the Arab and Jewish communities in a single State. The creation of a Jewish State under a partition scheme is the only hope of removing this issue from the area of conflict.

5. It is recognized that partition has been strongly opposed by Arabs, but it is felt that that opposition will be lessened by a solution which definitively fixes the extent of territory to be allotted to the Jews with its implicit limitation on immigration. The fact that the solution carries the sanction of the United Nations involves a finality which should allay Arab fears of further expansion of the Jewish State.

6. In view of the limited area and resources of Palestine, it is essential that, to the extent feasible, and consistent with the creation of two independent States, the economic unity of the country should be preserved. The partition

proposal, therefore, is a qualified partition, subject to such measures and limitations as are considered essential to the future economic and social well-being of both States. Since the economic self-interest of each State would be vitally involved, it is believed that the minimum measure of economic unity is possible, where that of political unity is not.(3)

"Palestine within its present borders following a transitional period of two years from Sept. 1, 1947-49 shall be constituted into an independent Arab State, an independent Jewish State, and the City of Jerusalem. During the transitional period, the present mandatory power shall carry on the administration. During the transitional period a legislative body shall be established in each state."(4)

B. Partition with the Economic Union:

A treaty shall be entered between the two states, containing the Economic Union of Palestine. The objectives of this Union shall be:

1. "A customs union.
2. Common currency.
3. Operation in the common interest of railways, postal and telephone.

(3) Ibid., p. 73.

(4) Ibid., p. 75.
New York Times, December 6, 1947.

4. Joint economic development especially in respect to irrigation." (5)

Commentary on Partition by the Committee

1. The primary objectives sought in the foregoing scheme are, in short, political division and economic unity: to confer upon each group, Arab and Jew, in its own territory, the power to make its own laws, while preserving to both, throughout Palestine, a single integrated economy, admittedly essential to the well-being of each, and the same territorial freedom of movement to individuals as is enjoyed today. The former necessitates a territorial partition; the latter, the maintenance of unrestricted commercial relations between the States, together with a common administration of functions in which the interests of both are in fact inextricably bound together.

2. The territorial division with the investment of full political power in the State achieves, in turn, the desire of each for statehood and at the same time creates a self-operating control of immigration.

3. The Economic Union is to be administered by a Joint Economic Board in the composition of which a parity of interest in the two States is recognized by equal representation from them. But in relation to such necessary and convenient

(5) Ibid.

services day-to-day rulings are imperative; and since in present circumstances it cannot be expected that in joint matters they would easily agree, the principle of arbitral decision is introduced by adding to the Board three independent outside persons to be chosen by the United Nations.

4. But in the larger view here are the sole remaining representatives of the Semitic race. They are in the land in which that race was cradled. There are no fundamental incompatibilities between them. The scheme satisfies the deepest aspiration of both; independence. There is a considerable body of opinion in both groups which seeks the course of cooperation. Despite, then, the drawback of the Arab minority, the setting is one from which, with goodwill and a spirit of cooperation, may arise a rebirth in historical surroundings of the genius of each people. The massive contribution made throughout the centuries by them in religious and ethical conceptions, in philosophy, and in the entire intellectual sphere, should excite among the leaders a mutual respect and a pride in their common origin.

5. The Jews bring to the land the social dynamism and scientific method of the West; the Arabs confront them with individualism and intuitive understanding of life. Here then, in this close association, through the natural emulation of each other, can be evolved a synthesis of the two civilizations, preserving, at the same time, their fundamental

characteristics. In each State, the native genius will have a scope and opportunity to evolve into its highest cultural forms and to attain its greatest reaches of mind and spirit.(6)

C. Boundaries:

"The proposed Arab State will include Western Galilee, Samaria and Judea with the exclusion of the city of Jerusalem. The Jewish State will include Eastern Galilee, the Esdraelon Plain, most of the coastal plain and the whole of the Beer-shaba Sub-district, which includes the Negab. The Jewish State has 498,000 Jews and 407,000 Arabs. The Arab State has 10,000 Jews and 725,000 Arabs. The city of Jerusalem has 100,000 Jews and 105,000 Arabs.(7)

D. The City of Jerusalem:

"The city shall be placed under international trusteeship system tied to the United Nations. It shall include Abu Dis, the most of Southern Bethlehem, the most of Western Ein Karm. The city should be included in the Economic Union of Palestine.(8)

(6) Report to the General Assembly by the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, pp. 80-81.

(7) Ibid., p. 83.

(8) Ibid., p. 88.

Justification

"The proposal to place the City of Jerusalem under international trusteeship is based on the following considerations:

1. Jerusalem is a Holy City for three faiths. Their shrines are side by side; some are sacred to two faiths. Hundreds of millions of Christians, Moslems and Jews throughout the world want peace and especially religious peace to reign in Jerusalem, the sacred character of its Holy Places to be preserved, access to them guaranteed to pilgrims from abroad.
2. The history of Jerusalem, during the Ottoman regime as under the mandate, shows that religious peace has been maintained in the City because the Government was anxious and had the power to prevent controversies involving some religious interest from developing into bitter strife and disorder. The Government was not intimately mixed in local politics and could, when necessary, arbitrate conflicts.
3. Religious peace in Jerusalem is necessary for the maintenance of peace in the Arab and in the Jewish States. Disturbances in the Holy City would have far-reaching consequences, extending perhaps beyond the frontiers of Palestine.
4. The City of Jerusalem shall be demilitarized and its neutrality shall be declared and preserved and no para-military formations, exercises or activities shall be permitted within

its borders.

5. Persons residing in the City of Jerusalem, without distinction as to ethnic origin, sex, language or religion, shall be ensured protection under its laws with regard to the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of worship, language, speech and publication, education, assembly, and association.

6. Residents of the City of Jerusalem, irrespective of nationality, may participate in the local elections of the City and they shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the City in respect of taxation and judicial proceedings.

7. A Governor of the City of Jerusalem shall be appointed by the Trusteeship Council. He shall be neither Arab nor Jew nor a citizen of the Palestine States nor, at the time of appointment, a resident of the City of Jerusalem.

8. In addition to the Governor, there shall be such other executive, legislative and judicial organs, bodies and offices for the government of the City as may be determined in the Trusteeship Agreement.

9. The protection of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites in the City of Jerusalem shall be entrusted to a special police force, the members of which shall be recruited outside of Palestine and shall be neither Arab nor Jew. The Governor shall be empowered to direct such budgetary provisions as may be necessary for the maintenance of this special force.

10. The City of Jerusalem should be included in the Economic Union of Palestine.(9)

III. Recommendations Approved by the Minority

A. Federal State Plan: It is recognized that Palestine is the common country of both indigenous Arabs and Jews, that both these peoples have had an historic association with it and that both play vital roles in the economic and cultural life of the country.

It would be a tragic mistake on the part of the international community not to bend every effort of support for the preservation of the unity of Palestine by the United Nations. This support would be an important factor in encouraging cooperation and collaboration between the two Semetic people of Palestine.

Thus the object of a Federal State solution would be to give the most feasible recognition to the nationalistic aspiration of both Arabs and Jews and to merge them into single loyalty and patriotism which would find expression in an independent Palestine. The Federal State is also in every respect the most democratic solution. It avoids the creation of national minority groups, and affords an opportunity for full and effective participation in representative government to

(9) Ibid., p. 86, 87, 88.

every citizen of the State. This solution would be most in harmony with the basic principles of the charter of the United Nations. This independent Federal State of Palestine shall comprise an Arab and a Jewish State. This plan was supported by three members (India, Iran, and Yugoslavia)* ** (10)

Recommendations

The undersigned representatives of India, Iran, and Yugoslavia, not being in agreement with the recommendation for partition formulated by the other members of the Committee, and for the reasons, among others stated above, present to the General Assembly the following recommendations, which in their view, constitute the most suitable solution to the problem of Palestine.

IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT --

1. The peoples of Palestine are entitled to recognition of their right to independence, and an independent federal State of Palestine shall be created following a transitional period not exceeding three years.

2. With regard to the transitional period, responsibility for administering Palestine and preparing it for independence under the conditions herein prescribed shall

(10) Ibid., p. 88-97.

be entrusted to such authority as may be decided upon by the General Assembly.

3. The independent federal State of Palestine shall comprise an Arab State and a Jewish State.

4. In delimiting the boundaries of the Arab and Jewish States, respectively, consideration shall be given to anticipated population growth.

5. During the transitional period a constituent assembly shall be elected by the population of Palestine, which shall formulate the constitution of the independent federal State of Palestine.

6. The governmental structure of the independent federal State of Palestine shall be federal and shall comprise a Federal Government and the Governments of the Arab and Jewish States respectively.

7. Among the organs of government there shall be a Head of State and an executive body, a representative federal legislative body, a federal court and such other subsidiary bodies as may be deemed necessary.

8. The federal legislative body shall be composed of two chambers.

9. Election to one chamber of the federal legislative body shall be on the basis of proportional representation of the population as a whole.

10. Arabic and Hebrew shall be official languages in

both the Federal and State Governments.

11. Each State shall be entitled to organize a police force for the maintenance of law and order.

12. The boundaries of the respective Arab and Jewish States in the independent federal State of Palestine shall be as indicated on the map attached to this report.

13. The problem of Jewish immigration into Palestine be dealt with in the following manner:

For a period of three years from the effective date of the beginning of the transitional period provided for in the solution to be applied to Palestine, even if the transitional period should be less, Jewish immigration shall be permitted into the borders of the Jewish State in the proposed independent Federal State of Palestine, in such numbers as not to exceed the absorptive capacity of the Jewish State, having due regard for the rights of the population then present within that State and for their anticipated natural rate of increase.(11)

(11) Ibid., p. 90.

CHAPTER IV

VIEWPOINTS, COMMENTS AND ATTITUDES OF THE PARTIES
TO THE DISPUTE BEFORE THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

On September 17, 1947, when the regular session of the General Assembly met at Lake Success the first item on the Agenda to be discussed and debated was the committee's report. The first to speak up was the United Kingdom Delegate. The United Kingdom's viewpoint

The representative of the United Kingdom declared that his government was in substantial agreement with the twelve general recommendations; in particular, the United Kingdom Government endorsed and wished to emphasize three of these recommendations: The termination of the Mandate, Independence, the problem of Jewish displaced persons. As to the first ones both of which were an exact expression of the guiding principle of British policy. As to the latter the United Kingdom Government believed that the entire problem of displaced persons in Europe, Jewish and non-Jewish alike, was an international responsibility demanding urgent attention.(1) The United Kingdom representative went on to say that the attitude of his government remained as then stated. His

(1) UN Official Records of the Second Session of the General Assembly, Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestine question; Second Meeting, Lake Success, New York, Sept. 26, 1947, p. 3

government was ready to cooperate with the assembly to the fullest extent possible. He could not easily imagine circumstances in which the United Kingdom would wish to prevent the application of a settlement recommended by the Assembly. The crucial question for His Majesty's Government was, however, the matter of enforcements of such a settlement. His government was ready to assume responsibility for implementing any plan on which agreement was reached by the Arabs and the Jews. If on the other hand, "the Assembly were to recommend a policy which was not acceptable to both parties the United Kingdom Government would not feel able to implement it, and the Assembly should therefore provide, in such a case, for some alternative authority to implement." (2)

On September 26, 1947, British Colonial Secretary Arthur Creech Jones told the United Nations that:

"Britain had decided to terminate its mandate and withdraw from Palestine regardless of whether a settlement was reached or not. The date for complete evacuation was given as August, 1948." (3)

View Point of the Arab Higher Committee

The representative of the Arab Higher Committee, Mr. G. Hussein, declared that it was the sacred duty of the Arabs of Palestine to defend their country against all aggressions

(2) Ibid., p. 3.

(3) Palestine Termination of the Mandate, His Majesty's Government Stationary Office, London, 1948, p. 11.

including the Zionists. The right and the testimony of the Arabs in Palestine, stated El Hussein, had been the subject of more than eighteen investigations within twenty-five years, and all to no purpose. Commissions of inquiry had either reduced the national and legal rights of the Palestine Arabs or had glossed them over. The few recommendations favorable to the Arabs had been ignored by the Mandatory Power. For these and for other reasons already communicated to the United Nations, it was not surprising that the Arab Higher Committee should have abstained from the nineteenth investigation (UNSCOP) and refused to appear before the Special Committee.(4) El Hussein declared that England is the one who created all of their troubles and England alone who is responsible for the miserable conditions of the Arabs.

"In education, the Jews had control of their own educational system while the Arabs were deprived of the right."(5),

"In economic fields, discrimination was still more apparent. The Mandatory power and the Jewish Agency had pursued a policy calculated to place obstacles in the way of

(4) UN Official Records, Ad Hoc Committee, op. cit., Third meeting, Sept. 29, 1947, p. 6.

(5) Ibid., p. 8.

Arab agricultural development while assisting Jewish industry. Mr. Hussein cited instances showing how action by the High Commissioner for Palestine during 1920 (who was a Jew himself), had compelled the sale of Arab lands by Arab debtors to the Jews and had led to the wiping out of many Arab villages."(6)

"In the financial field the government's policy of discrimination was common knowledge although the Arabs represented two-thirds of the population, the Jewish minority received one-half of the benefits of the budget, and Jewish local authorities had received a far greater proportion of government loans and special loans for housing and other purposes. The granting of the Jordan and Dead Sea concessions were instances of discrimination in favor of the Zionists in the field of economic development."(7) The representative of the Arab Higher Committee stated that, yielding to Zionist pressure, the United Kingdom Government had failed to implement its own decision, made in 1939, that Jewish immigration into Palestine must cease and then Palestine must become an independent unitary state within a fixed time.

No comments upon the UNSCOP, declared El Hussein, because the Arab Higher Committee considered that it could not

(6) Ibid., p. 9.

(7) Ibid., p. 9.

be used as a basis for discussion. Both the majority and the minority plans contained in the Report were inconsistent with the United Nations Charter and the Covenant of the League of Nations. "The Arabs of Palestine were solidly determined to oppose with all the means at their disposal any scheme which provided for the dissection, segregation or partition of their country or which gave to minority special and preferential rights and status." (8)

Viewpoints of the Jewish Agency for Palestine

The representative of the Jewish Agency for Palestine praised the special committee for its conscientious labors and good faith. On behalf of the Jewish Agency he supported ten of the eleven recommendations unanimously adopted by UNSCOP. The exception was recommendation VI (Jewish Displaced Persons). The Jewish Agency, he said, did not disapprove of this recommendation but did wish to call attention to the "intense urge" of the overwhelming majority of Jewish displaced persons to proceed to Palestine, a fact noted by both the Anglo-American Committee and by UNSCOP. (9)

The solution proposed by the minority of the Special Committee was unacceptable to the Jewish Agency. The majority proposal was not really satisfactory to the Jewish people,

(8) Ibid., p. 11.

(9) Ibid., p. 15.

either, according to the Balfour Declaration the National Home implied to Palestine and Transjordan. Transjordan had, nevertheless, been severed from Palestine in 1922 and had subsequently been set up as an Arab State. Now a second Arab State was to be carved out of the remainder of Palestine, with the result that the Jewish National Home would represent less than one-eighth of the territory originally set aside for it. Such a sacrifice, declared Dr. Silver, should not be asked of the Jewish people. (10)

The representative of the Jewish Agency also criticized the UNSCOP majority proposals concerning Jerusalem, saying that the Jewish section of modern Jerusalem (outside the walled city) should be included in the Jewish State. (11)

In conclusion he urged that the transitional period leading to the establishment of the Arab and Jewish States in Palestine be made as short as possible; at any rate shorter than the two-year limit proposed by UNSCOP. The representative of the Jewish Agency favored an international authority to be entrusted under the United Nations auspices, with the task of administering Palestine during the transitional period. (12)

(10) Ibid., p. 16.

(11) Ibid., p. 16.

(12) Ibid., p. 17-18.

Attitude of the Representative of Australia (Commonwealth)

The representative of Australia abstained from voting on the plans of partition on the ground that it is out of the scope of the Committee. He stated at the forty-sixth meeting of the Special Committee that he holds the view "that the primary obligation of the Committee in respect of the General Assembly is that of a recording, reporting and a fact-finding function." (13)

Mr. Hood went on to say that even it is true that the obligation is also laid on the Committee "to submit proposals as it may deem appropriate for the solution of the Palestine problem," but, since there is neither unanimity on any particular solution nor any decisive majority in favor of any particular course", the representative suggested that the whole question of Palestine should be reviewed and determined by the General Assembly.

Abdur-Rahman - Representative of India (Asiatic views)

In a special note handed to the General Assembly, the representative of India advocated that independence is the natural birthright of every people of the world. The denial of this right is the serious menace we have in the world today and the strained relations between the Arab world and the Mandatory today could be easily traced to these same

(13) Ibid., P.19

causes. As to the Balfour Declaration, it was made improperly and unjustly: Abdur-Rahman stated that it had no legal or moral validity not legal "as the British Government had no power to make it at the time when it was made", or even subsequently, "as they did not acquire any sovereignty over Palestine"; and not moral "as it was in contravention of the promises already made to the Arabs, who had given all the assistance required of them in pursuance of such promises and which was admitted by the General Assembly to have been "invaluable".(14) Thus it is possible to conceive that Lord Balfour either knew nothing about the promises which had already been made to the Arabs or had altogether forgotten them under the pressure of the war when it was passing through a critical juncture, and argued on behalf of the government to view the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine with favor. Justice M. Abdur-Rahman of India supported his statement by a speech made by Lloyd George in the Commons in June 1937.(15)

"It was one of the darkest periods of the war when Mr. Balfour prepared his Declarations. Let me recall the circumstances to the House. At the time the French Army had mutinied, the Italian army was on the eve of collapse and America had hardly started preparing in earnest. There was nothing left but Britain confronting the most powerful military combination the world has ever seen. It was important for us to seek every legitimate help we could get. We came to the conclusion, from information we received from every part of the world, that it was

(14) Ibid., p. 50.

(15) Ibid., p. 52.

vital we should have the sympathies of the Jewish community. I can assure the Committee that we did not come to the conclusion from any predilections or prejudices. Certainly we had no prejudices. Certainly we had no prejudices against the Arabs because at the moment we had hundreds and thousands of troops fighting for Arab emancipation from the Turks. (16)

Thus the Indian representative concluded that the Balfour Declaration "has no legal or moral validity" so it is illegal and immoral. He described the period between 1921-1947 as the "reign of terror" during which England had killed hundreds and thousands of Arabs and hundreds of houses were destroyed. During such a disturbed state of affairs it was impossible for the Arabs to develop their land and take part in peaceful pursuit which goes to develop a nation. While the Jews, who were siding with the government, continued the Indian Representative, lost no time in trying to consolidate their position, and with the help of the world Jewry and particularly those of America. What to say "of secondary and higher education even the elementary education was ignored". "There are no vocational institutions and nothing appears to have been done during this time towards training persons for social service. While millions of pounds have been spent on security measures and on the armed police." The fact, however, remains that the Mandatory Power cannot be held to have succeeded in preparing the people for self-government and thus violated the article twenty-two

(16) Ibid., p. 52.

of the Covenant of the Mandate." (17)

As to the "Displaced Persons" the duty of finding suitable places for these persons, advocated the representative, rests on the whole of the world and not only on Palestine. (18)

In conclusion, "Independence to be granted to Palestine as a whole, and a federal Palestinian State should be formed which should be composed of both Arab and Jews." (19)

Views of the Representative of Yugoslavia (Communist views)

In a letter sent to the chairman of the Special Committee on Palestine the Representative of Yugoslavia reminded him that when deciding the procedure to be adopted for the writing of the Committee's report to the General Assembly of the United Nations, it was resolved that a single report would be prepared and submitted. While on the other hand two different points of view had taken shape and were submitted to the General Assembly the Majority plan, favoured the partition and the Minority plan, favoured the creation of an independent federal state of Palestine.

(17) Ibid., p. 61.

(18) Ibid., p. 75.

(19) India was a British colony, and the Indians, who were striving at that time to achieve their independence had a common feeling with the Arabs and they well know what does it mean to be subjected to another nation.

This difference of opinion had arisen from a different appraisal of the historical, political, national and economic, aspects of the problem under consideration. "In accordance with that decision I have, not being able to agree with the majority plan," declared the representative of Yugoslavia, "reserved the right to submit separately my views on the main features of the historical background of the Palestine question, the appraisal and premises for the solution of the problem." (20)

The Palestine problem arose, stated the representative, from two different promises, one to the Arabs and another to the Jews. Aside from the newly created situation in the Near East where Great Britain had become the dominant power. In countries which were under her mandate or protectorate, Great Britain created a strong base for the realization of her imperial, political and economic interests.

"Great Britain from 1922 did not endeavor to prepare Palestine for independence." "She carried out her policy without the agreement of the interested Palestine parties, imposing this policy upon both Arabs and Jews." (21)

Simic (the Yugoslavia Representative) advocated that England had failed to bring together the Jews and the Arabs.

(20) Annexes, Appendices and Maps to the report by the UN Special Committee on Palestine to the General Assembly, (London: His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1947), p. 79.

(21) Ibid., p. 81.

She had kept them separated, just divide and rule.

"In 1922 the Arab representatives announced their readiness to accept Jewish settlement in Palestine and to cooperate for the progress of the land." (22)

"In 1930 a society was founded called the Worker's Brotherhood with the purpose of organizing Jewish and Arab workers in a common union. The initiative for the founding came from the people themselves. This meant that consciousness of the need for unified action and close co-operation among Arabs and Jews had strengthened. This attempt was doomed to temporary failure. The authorities forbid the organization to continue its activities and suppressed the publication of its newspaper." (23)

In 1943, 515 Arab and Jewish workers participated together in strikes.

In 1944, the number of strikers participating in such common strikes grew to 1,250. In 1945 to 2,350; 1946 to 30,000 and in 1947 to 40,000. These strikes are not merely of economic but of political significance as well. Demonstrations having as their slogan "unity of Arab and Jewish workers means victory" accompanied the strikes.

During the uprising itself, and especially during the

(22) Ibid., p. 83.

(23) Ibid., p. 85.

the Second War, new forces came into being within the framework of the Arab National Movement. These new forces were represented in the "League of the National Liberation of Palestine," working against the mandatory authority and for re-approachment and cooperation with the democratic Jewish forces. "These new forces", continued Simic, "formed expression also into the creation of a unified 'Arab Front'. The Arab Front gathered about itself those Arab politicians who considered that close cooperation with the Jews was vital for a successful struggle for independence."(24)

The mandatory kept the Jews and the Arabs apart even in schools, the representative declared, "as regards education and public health, we could not help but be struck by the extremely low percentage of budgetary expenditure under the above two items." The representative quoted: "In 1922-1923 the percentage was 4.86 education and 6.2 public health. In 1936-1937 it decreased to 3.99 in education and 3.3 in health. In 1943-1944, 3.09 education and 3.3 public health. In 1944-1945, 2.9 education and 2.7 public health.(25)

In social legislation, the representative stated "we are obliged to note the absence of progressive social legislation. Such elementary rights of the workers as the right

(24) Ibid., p. 86.

(25) Ibid., p. 88.

to form trade union, the right of assembly and strike, the limitation of working hours, minimum wages, compenstaion in case of discharge, payment for absence due to sickness and annual leave, are not provided for in the labour legislation of Palestine." (26)

Again Simic accused the mandatory of being a failure. "The disparity between the standards of the Jewish and Arab workers", he stated, is frequently referred to as one of the main causes of friction between Arabs and Jews in general." "Indicative of the absence of any positive policy on the part of the government to remove this disparity is the fact that it has failed to eliminate it even among its own employers of whom there are some 80,000 and when there is the additional glaring disparity between British employees on the one hand and Arab and Jewish employees on the other (of the 121 officials whose salaries amount to more than one thousand pounds a year - \$4,000.00 - 113 are British, only four are Arab, only three are Jews, while one is listed under the heading "others" --- and many similiar instances might be quoted). (27)

Thus in analyzing the various possible proposals regarding the future government of Palestine every one should bear

(26) Ibid., p. 89.

(27) Ibid., p. 89.

in mind the fact that Palestine consists of two peoples - the Arabs and the Jews and according to the representative, the main object of the committee is to reconcile them. "An essential premise on which our considerations of the problem and solutions should be based is the unquestionable fact that Palestine, within its present frontiers, constitutes an economic unit."(28)

Mr. Simic ended his letter stating "on the basis of such considerations, fundamental principles and premises, bearing in mind existing realities in Palestine, and prompted by a sincere desire to achieve a just and lasting solution of the Arab problem and of correctly settling relations between Arabs and Jews in a free and independent Palestine, their common state."(29)

The United States Attitude

On September 17, 1947, when the regular session of the General Assembly met at Lake Success, United States Secretary of State George C. Marshall declared that:

"The United States gives great weight not only to the recommendations which have met with unanimous approval of the Special Committee but also to those which have been approved by the majority of the committee."(30)

(28) Ibid., p. 102.

(29) Ibid., p. 102.

(30) Joseph Dunner, The Republic of Israel, op. cit., p. 78.

The Russian Attitude

The greatest surprise came from Russia; for the first time in the United Nations history the U.S.S.R. sided with the United States on a major issue by favoring the partition plan. After considerable discussion the United States and Russia decided on a plan similar in many respects to the majority proposal. A commission of five members was proposed to supervise the transition to independence, but it was not provided with either a military force, or the machinery of administration. A further reason is suggested by the tone of Russian speeches at the United Nations, which seemed bent on establishing the "principle" of partition. They pleaded the right of a minority to separate itself from the majority and from its own state.

Voting

The final act in the partition of Palestine was played out at the General Assembly of the United Nations in the fall of 1947.

On October 11, the United States delegation declared itself, with a few reservations, in favor of the plan for partition as submitted by the UN's Special Committee. Its support was based on two assumptions: That Arab opposition would be negligible, and That the proposed Jewish State could be made a "going concern" -- despite the consensus of expert

opinion that neither assumption was sound.(31) After its decision was made, the United States delegation proceeded on the principle that other countries should be allowed to make up their own minds. This principle was modified however, when it became apparent that if it were followed the partition plan would be defeated. A straw vote taken in the United Nations on Saturday, November 22, showed 24 States supporting the partition, 16 opposed, and the rest abstaining or undecided. The American Delegation was told at that point that the United States was committed to partition and that it must go through.(32)

By Wednesday, November 26, when the vote was taken in the Committee, the result was 25 to 13 -- one vote gained for the partition, three lost to its opponents, and the abstention increased by two. That was still not enough for the two-thirds majority needed for passage.

Here the Zionists took the fight into their hands. Rallying a group of influential Americans and selecting their targets with care, they exerted all possible influence, floods of telegrams and letters, and politics and economic pressure. Six countries which had indicated their

(31) Victor H. Bernstein - Speech - Congressional Records, Senate, Vol. 93, part 9, p. 10985-6.

(32) Kermit Roosevelt, The Partition of Palestine, The Middle East Journal, Jan. 1948, p. 13.

intention of voting against partition were the chosen targets: Haiti, Liberia, the Philippines, China, Ethiopia and Greece. All except Greece were either won to the voting for partition or persuaded to abstain.

These countries had many sound reasons for voting against partition. Aside from moral scruples about "self-determination" and the possible injustice of imposing partition on a country against the will of a majority of its inhabitants. Haiti has a sizeable number of Syrian citizens. Liberia, China, and the Philippines have large numbers of Moslems among their population. Ethiopia and Greece wish to be on good relations with their Moslem neighbors, who strongly oppose partition. (33)

The delegates of these six nations, and their home governments as well, were swamped with telegrams, phone calls, letters, and visitation. Many of the telegrams, particularly, were from Congressmen, and others as well invoked the name and prestige of the United States Government. An ex-Governor, a prominent Democrat with White House and other connections, personally telephoned Haiti urging that its delegation be instructed to change its vote. (34) He spoke

(33) Ibid., p. 14.

(34) Congressional Records, Vol. 93, Part 11, Nov. 28, 1947, p. 11656.

firmly and might be presumed to speak with authority. A well-known economist also close to the White House, and acting in a liaison capacity for the Zionist organization, exerted his powers of persuasion upon the Liberian delegate. Both states reversed themselves and voted for partition. After a good deal of "pressure politics" the final vote was cast with thirty-three for the partition plan and thirteen against it. Ten abstained from voting. (35)

A significant feature of the United Nations decision is that votes for partition were cast entirely by Christian nations, while those against it, with the exception of Cuba and Greece, came from non-Christian states.

When the final vote for partition was announced, the Zionists became delirious with joy. Street dances and mass meetings were held in Tel Aviv.

The Arabs were disappointed. The regular armies of the various Arab States encamped along Palestine's frontiers, and the Arab League is reported to have recommended that they will occupy the country when the British leave it.

On March 15, Great Britain signed a new twenty-year treaty of mutual defense and friendship with Trans-Jordan and that Brigadier Glubb Pasha and his staff would remain in

(35) For more detail see: UN Bulletin, March 15, 1948.

command of the Legion. After the English troops left Palestine, the Arab State Armies moved to capture Tel Aviv. Three weeks later, Glubb and his army (Trans-Jordan army) were five miles east of Tel Aviv. The Iraq Army was eight miles north of Tel Aviv. The Syrian Army and the Egyptian Armies were on the north and south. England gave the signal to Glubb to retreat and stop fighting. The Iraq Army which is under English control was told to stop fighting.

After three months, more than 40,000 volunteers entered Palestine. Hundreds of airplanes from the United States, Yugoslavis, and the U.S.S.R. were sent in.

The Zionist, seeing the armies of Iraq and Trans-Jordan retreating, attacked the Egyptian and drove them out of many cities. They drove on to the north-east until they reached the boundries of their state which were drawn by the United Nations Commission.

Another reason for the retreat of the Iraq and Trans-Jordan armies is the hatred between Abdulah and Elmufti (the president of the Arab Higher Committee of Palestine). Each wanted to rule the Arab State of Palestine. Egypt and Syria sided with Elmufti and were left to fight alone.

When the second truce started more than 850,000 Arabs fled to the neighboring states as refugees. Thus Jewish refugees stepped into Palestine while, 850,000 Arabs stepped

out to be refugees, 50,000 of whom died for lack of food and clothing.(36)

Another victim of the Partition Plan was the Assassination of Bernadotte. Count Folk Bernadotte of Sweden, official United Nations mediator proposed modification to the committee on Palestine in his final report to the United Nations. Three days after he was assassinated by a Jewish Terrorist. Under this plan all the Negeb would go to the Arabs and all of Galilee to Israel.

A final settlement of Israels frontiers has not yet been agreed upon, but after intermittent fighting in late 1948 and early 1949, Israel and its two chief antagonists, Egypt and Jordan, signed armistice agreement on February 24, and April 3, 1949, respectively. These were accomplished through the high efforts of Dr. Ralph Bunche of the United States, the successor of Bernadotte.

(36) Interim Report to the Fifth Session of the General Assembly, by the Director of the United Nations Relief and Work Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, Fifth Session Agenda, Item 20 (B) October 19, 1950, p. 10-11.

CHAPTER V

OBSERVATIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS
ABOUT THE COMMITTEE'S DECISION OF PARTITION

Here in Washington - and in the temples of the United Nations Brotherhood on New York's East forty-second street -- stated Lehrman in the commentary of December, 1953 - It has become a diplomatic maxim that like oil and water, the Arabs and the Israelis do not and cannot mix. (1) Mr. Lehrman has uncovered, after admittedly dogged search, knowledgeable observers who believe that Frenchmen and Tunisian may yet lie down together or Italians with Yugoslavs, or Pakistanis with Hindustans or even Soviet Russians with Americans, each armed to the teeth but willing to leave bad enough alone, short-term or maybe, longer. But Israel and the Arab States -never!

The Palestine Conciliation Commission, Lehrman continued, has made no real progress whatever in four years toward liquidating the existing state of war. The reason it has made no progress is that the most serious residue of that war has not been treated urgently and separately as the urgent and separate problem it is - namely the plight of the 880,000 Arab refugees. The refugee camps are hotbeds, not only of anti-western emotions that will take years to subside, but

(1) Hal Lehrman, "The Arabs, Israel and Near East Defense," Commentary, December, 1953, p. 563.

of active Communist propaganda as well. And until it is solved, other Middle Eastern political quarrels can't be resolved. They can only be quelled, as the British are now quelling one in Egypt.

Another view as to the outcome of the Partition Plan is that of Mr. George McGhee, Assistant Secretary of the State Department for the Middle East. "Let me speak very frankly on this question," said McGhee before the committee on Foreign Affairs, "The Political loss of the Near East to the Soviet Union would be a major disaster comparable to its loss during war. The Middle East may be critical to our national interests in time of war, but it is vital to us in time of peace."(2)

To the Assistant Secretary the Middle East is one of the most dangerous spots today. He pointed out that the main reason for the unrest is the refugees' problem. Seeing the danger, for this unsolved problem he analyzed the situation as:

1. As long as the refugee problem remains unresolved, the delicate equilibrium effected by the armistices is endangered.
2. As long as this problem remains unsolved, attainment of a political settlement in Palestine is delayed and a major source of friction between Israel and

(2) McGhee, Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 81st Congress - 20th Session; U.S. Printing Office, Washington, 1950, p. 9.

the Arab states is perpetuated to the detriment of peace in the entire Near East.

3. As long as this problem remains unresolved the refugees themselves will continue to serve as a natural focal point for exploitation by Communist and disruptive elements which neither we nor the Near Eastern Governments can afford to ignore.(3)

The Middle East's political disorder, according to McGhee, is the presence of three quarters of a million idle, destitute people - a number greater than the combined strength of all the standing armies of the Near East - whose discontent increases with the passage of time. Straight relief without any hope of solution is merely perpetuating and aggravating a bad condition. The morale of the people is continuously lowered and speaking frankly, the Assistant Secretary says that there is no means provided whereby the problem can be ultimately liquidated.(4)

To the present writer it is a stalemate and the American policy-makers are privately confessing their failure while they do not quite know what to try next. The same helplessness has filtered through the mess and to well informed and concerned public opinion, including that of American Jews.

Students of history, culture, and religion are watching with the greatest of interest and concern the outcome of the Partition Plan. The presence of Israel is a unique phenomenon

(3) Ibid., p. 9.

(4) Ibid., p. 15.

in the history of mankind. I do not know of a single other instance in the world where there is such radical existential discontinuity across national frontiers for it must not be forgotten that Israel is not as yet at peace with her immediate world. Her Arab and Moslem environment has not yet recognized her. She has no dealings whatsoever with her surroundings. Besides this radical political and economic estrangement, there is profound intellectual and spiritual chasm between Israel and the rest of the Near East. Two entirely different economies, two entirely different religions, two entirely different languages, two entirely different mentalities, two entirely different cultures, two entirely different civilizations, face each other across this chasm. Thus Israel is only geographically part of the Near East, and thus her fundamental problem is not how to establish herself but to integrate herself, economically, politically, and spiritually in the life and nature of the Middle East. Self-establishment by force is fairly easy - at least it is possible; but self-perpetuation by force is, in the nature of this case, absolutely impossible. Another inquiry is whether the concentration in one state of the factors at once of language, race, religion is not a challenge to the modern conception of the state, which is free of the necessary determination of any of these factors, and certainly of the three of them taken together. There is no other state in

the world today - nor has there been for centuries - which is nationally characterized by a race, a language, and a religion none of which nationally characterizes any other state. Israel alone is Jewish, Israel alone is Judaic. No state is alone Moslem or Christian or protestant or catholic.

No state alone is Syrian or Mongolian or Negro. And no state (except Israel and perhaps Ethiopia) has a national language of its own unconnected (in the sense of interaction) with any living language. This unique concentration of the three factors of race, language and religion is thus a challenge to the modern conception of the state.(5)

The world is viewing and wondering how a completely alien state that is suddenly thrust upon by the Partition Plan and that is not wanted by its immediate environment can survive, especially if this state has created for others the very problems - Arab refugees - it meant to solve for its own people. To these there has recently been added a more tangible and perhaps more serious factor of disunity in the physical existence of Israel on the only land bridge which connects the north-eastern and the western parts of the Arab world.

I think the Zionist idea, reinforced by an organization

(5) See My Mission In Israel, by James G. McDonald (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1951) and the Forrestal Diaries edited by Walter Millis (New York: Viking, 1951) - they are of special interest to the student of this subject.

and sharpened by the suffering of the Jews in recent years, has won a world-wide sympathy and support. Whether the Zionism in the next crucial phase of its development is resourceful to create genuine, internal relations of confidence and cooperation between itself and the Arab Nationalists or the Moslem Arab World in the midst of which it has chosen to plant itself is altogether beyond my ken to prophesy. Some writers, whatever their motive, have hailed the Partition Plan and have depicted Israel as destined to reconcile East and West. But how can one reconcile two things by being outside of them? The West is unthinkable apart from Christianity and the East apart from Islam. Israel is grounded neither in the one nor the other. Lebanon - little and fragile as she is - is the only country, not only in existence today but perhaps throughout history, where East and West meet and mingle with each other on a footing of equality. The vigorous Moslem citizens of Lebanon bring in the integral contribution of the East, while the Christian citizens are in deepest spiritual and historical communion with the West. If this situation can endure there is a wonderful possibility of creative confrontation.

The political Zionists had from the beginning a program of strong nationalism, a program with grave implications for those of the Jewish faith living in other countries. They hoped that a Jewish State in Palestine would become the center

of Jewish activities, claiming the loyalty and support of all Jews. The activity of the political Zionists has penetrated western political, social, and religious life more deeply and effectively than many of us realize. Parties inserted planks in their platforms supporting Zionism and the Partition Plan. Well known church leaders endorsed it, many of them not realizing all its implications. Many Christians have given generous financial support to the cause, hoping thereby to alleviate the intense suffering of Jews in Europe and hoping, also, that this would prove to be an effective way of combating anti-Semitism. Many sincere and earnest Christians have their support and to Zionism and the Plan of Partition because they believe that the return of the Jews to Palestine is the fulfillment of prophecy. Other well meaning, sincere Christians have felt they could not support political Zionism.

After years of growing tensions between Arab Nationalism and Zionism with some tragic mistakes on the part of Great Britain, with no stable foreign policy on the part of the United States in the Near East, with bitterness being engendered as political Zionism increased in power, with the Jews in European concentration camps, dying, desperate, finding all other doors closed to them, clamoring to go to Palestine - finally on November 29, 1947, the United Nations by a vote of 33 to 13 partitioned Palestine.

Zionist nationalism has succeeded in establishing the State of Israel, which was recognized immediately by the United States. Jewish immigrants began at once to pour into the tiny state. What can we say of its future? The Jews are hard workers, astute businessmen, clever financiers, good organizers. The new state has shown signs of great vigor. But the population is heterogeneous and generally secular and materialistic. There are many political parties, some of them reactionary or radical, others liberal, sane, steady. The influx of great numbers of immigrants has created grave economic problems. At the present rate of immigration it is estimated that by 1953 only one person in four will have been residents in the area prior to 1948. (6)

Thus Zionism, one of the most subtle and persistent of nationalisms, has, with the assistance of the United Nations succeeded in creating a political Jewish State. But the flight of some 850,000 refugees has created new economic, social and political problems for the Arabs around Israel. It has brought division in Arab groups, has caused frustration and bewilderment among Christians and has aroused feeling of bitterness and animosity among Arabs. The presence of one million refugees is a disgrace and a great reminder of their

(6) Glora M. Wysner, Near East Panorama, (New York: Friendship Press, 1950), p. 91.

defeat and weakness. The assassination of King Abdulah, three revolutions in Syria, a military government in Lebanon and Egypt - all of these happened as a result of the Partition Plan and the flight of the refugees. England anticipated all of these crisis and troubles and is expecting many more to come. Let it not be forgotten that His Majesty's Government, who carried on the Zionization of Palestine, rejected the partition plan recommended by the UNSCOP and again played her game of politics with the United States "Pull me, push you" knowing that the Partition Plan was a going concern in the United Nations and that the United States had completely pledged herself to the Partition Plan, His Majesty's Government rejected the plan on the grounds that it was contrary to their mandate policy and to the promises given to the Arabs in the past. Two main reasons of the rejection of the partition were given by His Majesty's Government: First, political: "Palestine is the center of communications of the Arab world and it has common frontiers with four Arab States. There is no doubt that the forcible creation of a Jewish State in the heart of the Arab world introduces a new, highly disturbing threat to peace and security in the Middle East."(7)

(7) UN Official Records of the 2nd Session of the General Assembly. Ad Hoc Committee, Anea, Document A/AC 14/ 32 and Addition 1, November 11, 1947, p. 29.

The second: "Partition is no solution for minority problem." His Majesty's Government cannot justify the partition on the ground of a "minority status". "The existence of a Jewish minority does not invalidate the establishment of a unitary state in Palestine. There have been and there still are, minorities in many countries. Some minorities existed originally as part of the indigenous populations while other minorities were created by immigration. The United Nations cannot subscribe to the principle that a racial or religious minority, whether arising from natural development or created as a result of immigration, can exist upon the breaking up of a homeland or shatter the political, geographical and economic unity of a country without the consent and against the wishes of the majority." If it is adopted, declared His Majesty's Government, "it will constitute a 'dangerous principle' and thus become a source of 'internal conflict and international disorder'." Beside that "we have to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms" such scheme is "undemocratic and untenable."(8)*

(8) Ibid., p. 294-295

*(The writer would like to invite the attention of the reader to the fact that His Majesty's Gov't. is accusing the UN of over-stepping the primary principles and fundamentals of human rights by imposing the partition plan "without the consent and against the wishes of the majority". This is to His Majesty's Gov't. "undemocratic and untenable". While it is an international crime to the UNSCOP and the UN to ignore the self-determination right, it is not so to His Majesty's Gov't., when she announced the Balfour Declaration, promising to give a land with people to people without a land. It is not so, not to consult, but to impose by bloodshed and terror the rules of immigration on a

To the Arabs and the Middle East this defeat and those refugees are not a new phenomenon. It is another ring added to that long chain of the East-West conflict:

Greek versus Persia
 Rome versus Carthage
 Persia versus Rome
 Crusaders versus Saracen
 Ottomans versus Europe.

While on the field now we view the face-to-face clashes and conflict of extreme Zionism versus fantastic Arab-Nationalism.

Musa Alami, an Arab refugee and a member of the Arabs-Palestinian Higher Committee in Egypt, is preparing the Arabs for a second round. Writing in the Middle East Journal he declared that "Palestine and self-respect of the Arabs must be recovered. Without Palestine there is no life for them. This is the first phase of a long war."(9)

With the establishment of a Jewish foothold and base in the Middle East the Arabs are faced with a new danger. The ambitions of the Jews are not limited as in the Partition Plan or Palestine alone, but embrace other parts of the Arab world. In a message to his people last year, Mr. Ben-Gurion, stated: "Prepare to achieve our final goal in the construction of the Jewish State, the gathering-in of the Jews of the

majority to see 45,000 Jews in 1915 & 600,000 Jews in 1939. A small wonder, someone might ask his Maj. Gov't. if the right of self-determination is respected in Africa and Asia? And if it is not undemocratic and untenable?

(9) Mussa Alami, "The Lesson of Palestine," Middle East Journal, October, 1949, p. 386.

world, and the fulfillment of scriptural promises."(10)

The Zionist program dates back to the days of Herzl, and it is based on the colonization of Palestine and the revival of the Jewish Kingdom as it was in its golden age. Palestine then will become, then , the base for exploiting all the Arab Middle East and extending the economic interests of the Jews. In their definition, Palestine included present day State of Israel, Jordan, and a large portion of Syria, Lebanon and Egypt...The dream of a greater Jewish State between the Nile and the Euphrates. This program which they are implementing step by step will have as its next step, says the Arabs, to take all of Palestine, and then they will proceed according to circumstances which they themselves will create. To this they will bring all their power, influence, wealth and abilities at home as well as in London and Washington. This is the danger which faces the Arabs, and which obliges them to change their way - the way of China - if it is necessary to protect their country to bring back the lost sheep. The Arabs, to meet this challenge, needs unity and modernization and here again they meet opposition, open or hidden, from two sides. These two sides, according to Alami, are the British and the Jews.

(10) Ibid., p. 387.

As for the Jews, they have their ambitions, they fear the Arabs, and they want to preserve the opportunity to implement the remaining parts of their program. It is very important to the Jews that no Arab force, capable of recovering Palestine or constituting a danger to their state, be created in neighboring territories. They are afraid that this force will be created through unity and modernization, and here the Arabs have to watch closely to the fifth column in their countries (the Jews).

As for the British, it was they who divided the Arab countries. They are satisfied with this and with the fact that the Arabs should be distracted from true unity. Partition, backwardness and rivalry further their interests and aims. The British are those who plunged the Arabs into this disaster. They are trying, and will try, to delay their progress toward unity and modernization. The English are strengthening the existing regimes with their regionalism, partition and bad governments, and to distract the Arabs from thinking about their crimes against them by waving in front of them loans and welfare projects.

The Arabs believe that Israel is a stranger among them and was forced on them to prevent their unity and it is a thorn in their side.

"The disaster has shaken us," concluded El-Alamy, profoundly and wounded us deeply and opened the door to a

great danger. If the shock wakes us up, brings us together, and impels us to a new life from which we can derive strength, the wound will heal, the danger will be averted, and Palestine will be covered. Then the misfortunes will be a blessing. But if not, woe to the outcome."(11)

(11) Ibid., p. 405.

CHAPTER VI

THE COMMITTEE'S DECISION:
THE "ARAB EAST" AND THE COLD WARIn Power Relationships:

The only groups among the Arabs and the Jews that favored Partition and reconciliation, are the Communists. While the weakness of Communist appeal among both Arabs and Jews in the past suggests that neither group finds itself attracted to the ideologies and practices of modern communism, the current strategy and tactics of world communism have supplied the elasticity for an expansion of communist influence. By throwing its anti-religious slogans overboard, communist labor leaders in Arab countries have been able to find followers much more readily than in the past. Kurds, Armenians, Jews and other non-Arab minorities have been made the targets of special propaganda drives. It is within this framework that communist efforts in Palestine must be viewed.

Jewish communists, are among also, the most vociferous advocates of cooperation with the Arabs. They are opposed to Jewish "national production" which would discriminate against Arab workers. In this they follow the line of other left-wing groups, notably Hashomer-Hatzair. They are also opposed to the advocacy of a Jewish State or commonwealth over all of Palestine, the so-called "Biltmore Program." They are thus able to retain and bridge to the Arab minority

inside Israel, and in many respects are not at least outwardly a moderating influence.*

The entire area is characterized by paralyzing fears and by racial, political, and social tensions. Russia on the north has caused Turkey and Iran to be gripped by fear of being engulfed, while communist ideology is known to be penetrating many areas, although it has always met with strong resistance among orthodox Moslems. The thousands of Palestinian refugees have created added political unrest, insecurity, and economic chaos; on the other hand, the establishment of the State of Israel as recommended by the UNSCOP and voted by the United Nations, has not lessened instability, or has it decreased the problem of the area, The new state has many internal problems with which to wrestle, while at the same time it tries to develop a foreign policy that will win for it confidence, cooperation, financial and moral support. It is surrounded by hostile and bitter neighbors. The whole area - once known as Palestine - seethes with political and religious conflicts that involve all the world, and their solution is essential to world peace. But "the United States" declared Dr. Wysner, "is more deeply involved economically and politically in the

*The Arabs in Israel have four communist representatives in Parliament.

Near East than in the Far East or even in Europe."(12)

The people of this area today are receiving wave after wave of propaganda from East and West. They are told by the West that they are backward, under-developed and in need of European tutelage and protection. They are told by the East that they are exploited, enslaved and despised, and should revolt against Western domination. In fact, they are receiving no genuine friendship or sympathy or understanding from either side.

In spite of these strong currents, they still stand adamantly for their faith and heritage. It is true that they are more inclined towards Western thoughts, but they refuse to be the vassals of the West. Although opposed to the material creed of the East, they feel impressed by its support of their human dignity and national aspiration.

"I have complete faith in the wisdom of our people," said Ahmed Azam, the Secretary of the Arab League, "but I fear that they may, under that dual pressure, become indifferent and disinterested."(13) The consequences of such a state of mind in the Middle East, as an eternal center of spiritual ideas, will have tremendous repercussions in Asia

(12) Wysner, op. cit., p. 77.

(13) Ahmad Azam, "The Middle East and the Cold War," The United Nations World, (New York: United World Corporation, March, 1951), Vol. 5. No. 3, p. 44.

and Africa. While the East, said Azam, under able leadership that combines ideological with material energies, is penetrating deeply into Asia and Africa, and the West, with no real moral leadership while attempting to harness old concepts of imperialism to new concepts of nationalism, is but confusing the peoples of the Middle East. The West is trying dangerously to harmonize nineteenth-century tutelage with the twentieth century's ideas of sovereign rights and the principles of self-determination. While maintaining a masterly attitude of superiority over these Middle Eastern peoples, curiously enough the West is paradoxically attempting to secure the voluntary cooperation of those long-subjected peoples.

This confused approach cannot appeal to the hearts and minds of the Arabs and Moslem peoples. The only resistance to communism that is being shown at present by the masses of the people in the Middle East stems from their religious faith. It is high time for England, France and particularly America to reconsider their attitude towards the nations of the Middle East and to try some note which will find response in the hearts and minds of 70,000,000 Arabs and 300,000,000 Moslems, extending from China to Morocco. Failing this, the West will lose the support of these peoples in the ideological contest; and the East, through a persuasive, strong

and well directed mental penetration may ultimately gain the upper hand.

Abed El-Rahman Azam Pasha, the Secretary of the Arab League, stated lately: "All the imperialistic powers have lost their chance to assume the moral leadership of the Asiatic and African peoples."(14)

"The only country in the Western camp which can still have a chance of an appeal to the hearts and the minds of the oriental masses in this country, is the United States."(15)

"Its past history and relations with the oriental world is an example of fair-mindedness and human good relations. They have known the United States through the last fifty years as good businessmen, teachers, doctors, and missionaries. They recognized America as a nation which stands for freedom and fair-play, and in spite of recent blunders, the Middle East has not lost faith in American good will."(16)

Ben Horin, who spent sixteen years in the Middle East, stated in his book, The Middle East:

"The future of the Middle East may now depend on the United States more than any other World power. Unlike

(14) United Nation World, United Nation World Incorporation, op. cit., p. 45.

(15) Ibid., p. 45.

(16) Ibid., p. 55.

Britain, America never displayed selfish desires for the exploitation of colonies. But the United States doesn't have a real policy in the Middle East. She is just a follower and endorses anything England wants. (17)

When Ben-Horin came back from the Middle East he carried with him a message:

"It is a message from the Middle East to the greatest democracy on earth. It is a message from peoples who once shaped faith and civilization for humanity at large, and who are today in a state of misery and war. (18)

If the United States wants to make sure that peace and freedom will rule the world, it must come nearer to the scene of the trouble. It must not look at the world and its involved problems through the glasses of any other nation, but through its own spectacles.

Thus America is in a good position to exercise considerable influence on both sides (Arabs and Jews) to accept any kind of settlement; and acceptance may grow into permanent peace.

I believe it is up to Israel, and to her advantage, to take the initiative. The Jews, notwithstanding their ancient connections with the land, are now the newcomers. Moreover

(17) Ben-Horin, The Middle East. (New York: The World Publishing Company, 1949), p. 87.

(18) Ibid., p. 89.

the Arabs can get along better without them than they can get along without the Arabs. Though both could gain incalculably from friendly cooperation, provided Israel will make the effort.

Walter Zander warning his people, stated:

"If military success encourages Zionists to continue to ignore the Arabs, the end result can only be disaster. Military success will bring only temporary respite; and until we succeed to secure the good will of the Arabs, a dark and portentous shadow remains over the national home."(19)

All friends of Zionism should unite in urging that truth upon the new state. As Count Bernadotte wrote shortly before his assassination:

"Above all the Jewish State needs peace. A new organism of limited resources, its hope for development must very largely depend in the long run on the cultivation of peaceful and mutually trusting relations with the neighboring Arab States whose overwhelming numbers dwarf into insignificance any population total to which the Jewish State may aspire."(20)

I believe, myself, that integration must be the solution for Jewish and other minority problems. But the Jews cannot do the job alone. And for the tragedy of Palestine, it should not be forgotten that the United Nations bears the heaviest responsibility.

(19) Kermit Roosevelt, op. cit., p. 188.

(20) Ibid.

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APPENDIX

APPENDIX 1

DOCUMENTS: BRITISH PROMISES TO THE ARABS

I. EXTRACTS FROM THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN SIR HENRY MCMAHON, H.M. HIGH COMMISSIONER IN CAIRO, AND THE SHERIF HUSSEIN OF MECCA. Cmd. 5957.

No. 1. FROM THE SHERIF OF MECCA TO SIR HENRY MCMAHON, HIS MAJESTY'S HIGH COMMISSIONER IN CAIRO.

July 14, 1915.

Whereas the whole of the Arab nation without any exception have decided in these last years to live, and to accomplish their freedom, and grasp the reins of their administration both in theory and practice; and whereas they have found and felt that it is to the interest of the Government of Great Britain to support them and aid them to the attainment of their firm and lawful intentions... And whereas it is to their (the Arabs') interest also to prefer the assistance of the Government of Great Britain in consideration of their geographical position and economic interests, and also of the attitude of the above-mentioned Government, which is known to both nations and therefore need not be emphasised;

For these reasons the Arab nation see fit to limit themselves, as time is short, to asking the Government of Great Britain, if it should think fit, for the approval, through her deputy or representative, of the following

fundamental propositions, leaving out all things considered secondary in comparison with these, so that it may prepare all means necessary for attaining this noble purpose, until such time as it finds occasion for making the actual negotiations: --

Firstly: -- England to acknowledge the independence of the Arab countries, bounded on the north by Mersina and Adana up to the 37° of latitude, on which degree fall Birijik, Urfa, Mardin, Midiat, Jezirat (Ibn 'Umar), Amadia, up to the border of Persia; on the east by the borders of Persia up to the Gulf of Basra; on the south by the Indian Ocean, with the exception of the position of Aden to remain as it is; on the west by the Red Sea, the Mediterranean Sea up to Mersina. England to approve of the proclamation of an Arab Khalifate of Islam....

No. 2. FROM SIR H. MCMAHON TO THE SHERIF OF MECCA.

August 30, 1915.

We have the honour to thank you for your frank expressions of the sincerity of your feeling towards England. We rejoice, moreover, that your Highness and your people are of one opinion-- that Arab interests are English interests and English Arab....With regard to the questions of limits and boundaries, it would appear to be premature to consume our time in discussing such details in the heat of war, and while, in many portions of them, the Turk is up to now in effective

occupation....

No. 3. FROM THE SHERIF OF MECCA TO SIR H. MCMAHON.

September 9, 1915.

...As the limits and boundaries demanded are not those of one person whom we should satisfy and with whom we should discuss them after the war is over, but our peoples have seen that the life of their new proposal is bound at least by these limits and their word is united on this:

Therefore, they have found it necessary first to discuss this point with the Power in whom they now have their confidence and trust as a final appeal, viz., the illustrious British Empire....

No. 4. FROM SIR H. MCMAHON TO THE SHERIF OF MECCA.

October 24, 1915.

...I have realised, however, from your last letter that you regard this question as one of vital and urgent importance. I have, therefore, lost no time in informing the Government of Great Britain of the contents of your letter, and it is with great pleasure that I communicate to you on their behalf the following statement, which I am confident you will receive with satisfaction:--

The two districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo cannot be said to be purely Arab, and should be excluded from the limits demanded.

With the above modification, and without prejudice to

our existing treaties with Arab chiefs, we accept those limits.

As for those regions lying within those frontiers wherein Great Britain is free to act without detriment to the interests of her ally, France, I am empowered in the name of the Government of Great Britain to give the following assurances and made the following reply to your letter:

(1) Subject to the above modifications, Great Britain is prepared to recognise and support the independence of the Arabs in all the regions within the limits demanded by the Sherif of Mecca.

(2) Great Britain will guarantee the Holy Places against all external aggression and will recognise their inviolability.

(3) When the situation admits, Great Britain will give to the Arabs her advice and will assist them to establish what may appear to be the most suitable forms of government in those various territories.

(4) On the other hand, it is understood that the Arabs have decided to seek the advice and guidance of Great Britain only, and that such European advisers and officials as may be required for the formation of a sound form of administration will be British.

(5) With regard to the vilayets of Bagdad and Basra, the Arabs will recognise that the established position and

interests of Great Britain necessitate special administrative arrangements in order to secure these territories from foreign aggression, to promote the welfare of the local populations and to safeguard our mutual economic interests....

No. 5. FROM THE SHERIF OF MECCA TO SIR H. MCMAHON.

November 5, 1915.

I. In order to facilitate an agreement...we renounce our insistence on the inclusion of the vilayets of Mersina and Adana in the Arab Kingdom. But the two vilayets of Aleppo and Beirut and their sea coasts are purely Arab vilayets, and there is no difference between a Moslem and a Christian Arab: they are both descendants of one forefather...

No. 6. FROM SIR H. MCMAHON TO THE SHERIF OF MECCA.

December 14, 1915.

I am gratified to observe that you agree to the exclusion of the districts of Mersina and Adana from boundaries of the Arab territories.... With regard to the vilayets of Aleppo and Beirut, the Government of Great Britain have fully understood and taken careful note of your observations, but, as the interests of our ally, France, are involved in them both, the question will require careful consideration and a further communication on the subject will be addressed to you in due course.

No. 7. FROM THE SHERIF OF MECCA TO SIR H. MCMAHON.

January 1, 1916.

As regards the northern parts and their coasts, we have already stated in our previous letter what were the utmost possible modifications, and all this was only done so to fulfil those aspirations whose attainment is desired by the will of the Blessed and Supreme God. It is this same feeling and desire which impelled us to avoid what may possibly injure the alliance of Great Britain and France and the agreement made between them during the present wars and calamities; yet we find it our duty that the eminent minister should be sure that, at the first opportunity after this war is finished, we shall ask you (what we avert our eyes from to-day) for what we now leave to France in Beirut and its coasts....It is impossible to allow any derogation that gives France, or any other Power, a span of land in those regions.

II. EXTRACT FROM THE REPORT (DATED MARCH 16, 1939) OF A COMMITTEE SET UP TO CONSIDER THE ABOVE CORRESPONDENCE. Cmd. 5974.

Both the Arab and the United Kingdom representatives have tried (as they hope with success) to understand the point of view of the other party, but they have been unable to reach agreement upon an interpretation of the Correspondence, and they feel obliged to report to the conference

accordingly.

The United Kingdom representatives have, however, informed the Arab representatives that the Arab contentions, as explained to the committee, regarding the interpretation of the Correspondence, and especially their contentions relating to the meaning of the phrase "portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Hama, Homs, and Aleppo", have greater force than has appeared hitherto.

Furthermore, the United Kingdom representatives have informed the Arab representatives that they agree that Palestine was included in the area claimed by the Sherif of Mecca in his letter of the 14th July, 1915, and that unless Palestine was excluded from that area later in the Correspondence it must be regarded as having been included in the area in which Great Britain was to recognise and support the independence of the Arabs. They maintain that on a proper construction of the Correspondence Palestine was in fact excluded. But they agree that the language in which its exclusion was expressed was not so specific and unmistakable as it was thought to be at the time.... (The report here refers to certain other statements made to Arab leaders during and after the war.) In the opinion of the Committee it is, however, evident from these statements that His Majesty's Government were not free to dispose of Palestine without regard for the wishes and interests of the inhabitants of Palestine, and that these statements must all be taken

into account in any attempt to estimate the responsibilities which -- upon any interpretation of the Correspondence--His Majesty's Government have incurred towards those inhabitants as a result of the correspondence.

III. THE HOGARTH MESSAGE

The following are the terms of the message which Commander Hogarth was instructed to deliver to King Hussein when he visited Jedda in January 1918:

"(1) The Entente Powers are determined that the Arab race shall be given full opportunity of once again forming a nation in the world. This can only be achieved by the Arabs themselves uniting, and Great Britain and her Allies will pursue a policy with this ultimate unity in view.

"(2) So far as Palestine is concerned we are determined that no people shall be subject to another, but

(a) in view of the fact that there are in Palestine shrines, Wakfs and Holy Places, sacred in some cases to Moslems alone, to Jews alone, to Christians alone, and in other to two or all three, and inasmuch as these places are of interest to vast masses of people outside Palestine and Arabia, there must be a special regime to deal with these places approved of by the world.

(b) As regards the Mosque of Omar it shall be considered as a Moslem concern alone and shall not be subjected directly or indirectly to any non-Moslem authority.

"(3) Since the Jewish opinion of the world is in favour of a return of Jews to Palestine and inasmuch as this opinion must remain a constant factor, and further as His Majesty's Government view with favour the realization of this aspiration, His Majesty's Government are determined that in so far as is compatible with the freedom of the existing population both economic and political, no obstacle should be put in the way of the realization of this ideal.

"In this connexion the friendship of world Jewry to the Arab cause is equivalent to support in all States where Jews have a political influence. The leaders of the movement are determined to bring about the success of Zionism by friendship and co-operation with the Arabs, and such an offer is not to be lightly thrown aside."

IV. THE DECLARATION TO THE SEVEN ARAB LEADERS (June 1918).

His Majesty's Government have considered the memorial of the seven with the greatest care....

The areas mentioned in the memorandum fall into four categories:

1. Areas in Arabia which were free and independent before the outbreak of war;
2. Areas emancipated from Turkish control by the action of the Arabs themselves during the present war;
3. Areas formerly under Ottoman dominion, occupied

by the Allied forces during the present war;

4. Areas still under Turkish control.

In regard to the first two categories, His Majesty's Government recognize the complete and sovereign independence of the Arabs inhabiting these areas and support them in their struggle for freedom.

In regard to the areas occupied by Allied forces.... it is the wish and desire of His Majesty's Government that the future government of these regions should be based upon the principle of the consent of the governed and this policy has and will continue to have the support of His Majesty's Government.

In regard to the areas mentioned in the fourth category, it is the wish and desire of His Majesty's Government that the oppressed peoples of these areas should obtain their freedom and independence and towards the achievement of this object His Majesty's Government continue to labour....

V. THE ANGLO-FRENCH DECLARATION OF NOVEMBER 7, 1918.

The object aimed at by France and Great Britain in prosecuting in the East the War let loose by the ambition of Germany is the complete and definite emancipation of the peoples so long oppressed by the Turks and the establishment of national governments and administrations deriving their authority from the initiative and free choice of the indigenous populations.

In order to carry out these intentions France and Great

Britain are at one in encouraging and assisting the establishment of indigenous governments and administrations in Syria and Mesopotamia, now liberated by the Allies, and in the territories the liberation of which they are engaged in securing and recognizing these as soon as they are actually established.

Far from wishing to impose on the populations of these regions any particular institutions they are only concerned to ensure by their support and by adequate assistance the regular working of governments and administrations freely chosen by the populations themselves. To secure impartial and equal justice for all, to facilitate the economic development of the country by inspiring and encouraging local initiative, to favour the diffusion of education, to put an end to dissensions that have too long been taken advantage of by Turkish policy, such is the policy which the two Allied Governments uphold in the liberated territories.

APPENDIX 2

THE TERMS OF THE PALESTINE MANDATE*

Article 1. The Mandatory shall have full powers of legislation and of administration, save as they may be limited by the terms of this mandate.

Article 2. The Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home, as laid down in the preamble, and the development of self-governing institutions, and also for safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion.

Article 3. The Mandatory shall, so far as circumstances permit, encourage local autonomy.

Article 4. An appropriate Jewish agency shall be recognized as a public body for the purpose of advising and cooperating with the administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish national home and the interests of the Jewish population in Palestine, and, subject always to the control of the administration, to assist and take part in the development of the country.

The Zionist organization, so long as its organization and constitution are in the opinion of the Mandatory

* See Annexes, appendices and maps to the Report by the UN; Official Documents.

appropriate, shall be recognized as such agency. It shall take steps in consultation with His Britannic Majesty's Government to secure the co-operation of all Jews who are willing to assist in the establishment of the Jewish national home.

Article 5. The Mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that no Palestine territory shall be ceded or leased to, or in any way placed under the control of, the government of any foreign Power.

Article 6. The administration of Palestine, while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudices, shall facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions and shall encourage, in co-operation with the Jewish agency referred to in Article 4, close settlement by Jews on the land, including state lands and waste lands not required for public purposes.

Article 7. The administration of Palestine shall be responsible for enacting a nationality law. There shall be included in this law provisions framed so as to facilitate the acquisition of Palestinian citizenship by Jews who take up their permanent residence in Palestine.

Article 8. The privileges and immunities of foreigners, including the benefits of consular jurisdiction and protection as formerly enjoyed by capitulation or usage in the Ottoman Empire, shall not be applicable in Palestine.

Unless the Powers whose nationals enjoyed the aforementioned privileges and immunities on August 1, 1914, shall have previously renounced the right to their re-establishment, or shall have agreed to their non-application for a specified period, these privileges and immunities shall, at the expiration of the mandate, be immediately re-established in their entirety or with such modifications as may have been agreed upon between the Powers concerned.

Article 9. The Mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that the judicial system established in Palestine shall assure to foreigners, as well as to natives, a complete guarantee of their rights.

Respect for the personal status of the various peoples and communities and for their religious interests shall be fully guaranteed. In particular, the control and administration of Wakfs shall be exercised in accordance with religious law and the dispositions of the founders.

Article 10. Pending the making of special extradition agreements relating to Palestine, the extradition treaties in force between the Mandatory and other foreign Powers shall apply to Palestine.

Article 11. The administration of Palestine shall take all necessary measures to safeguard the interests of the community in connection with the development of the country, and, subject to any international obligations accepted by the Mandatory, shall have full power to provide for public

ownership or control of any of the natural resources of the country or of the public works, services and utilities established or to be established therein. It shall introduce a land system appropriate to the needs of the country, having regard, among other things, to the desirability of promoting the close settlement and intensive cultivation of the land.

The administration may arrange with the Jewish agency mentioned in Article 4 to construct or operate, upon fair and equitable terms, any public works, services and utilities, and to develop any of the natural resources of the country, in so far as these matters are not directly undertaken by the administration. Any such arrangements shall provide that no profits distributed by such agency, directly or indirectly, shall exceed a reasonable rate of interest on the capital, and any further profits shall be utilized by it for the benefit of the country in a manner approved by the administration.

Article 12. The Mandatory shall be entrusted with the control of the foreign relations of Palestine and the right to issue exequaturs to consuls appointed by foreign Powers. He shall also be entitled to afford diplomatic and consular protection to citizens of Palestine when outside its territorial limits.

Article 13. All responsibility in connection with the Holy Places and religious buildings or sites in Palestine,

including that of preserving existing rights and of securing free access to the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites and the free exercise of worship, while ensuring the requirements of public order and decorum, is assumed by the Mandatory, who shall be responsible solely to the League of Nations in all matters connected herewith, provided that nothing in this article shall prevent the Mandatory from entering into such arrangement as he may deem reasonable with the administration for the purpose of carrying the provisions of the article into effect; and provided also that nothing in this mandate shall be construed as conferring upon the Mandatory authority to interfere with the fabric or the management of purely Moslem sacred shrines, the immunities of which are guaranteed.

Article 14. A special commission shall be appointed by the Mandatory to study, define and determine the rights and claims relating to the different religious communities in Palestine. The method of nomination, the composition and the functions of this commission shall be submitted to the Council of the League for its approval, and the commission shall not be appointed or enter upon its functions without the approval of the Council.

Article 15. The Mandatory shall see that complete freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, are ensured to all. No discrimination of any kind

shall be made between the inhabitants of Palestine on the ground of race, religion or language. No person shall be excluded from Palestine on the sole ground of his religious belief.

The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the education of its own members in its own language, while conforming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the administration may impose, shall not be denied or impaired.

Article 16. The Mandatory shall be responsible for exercising such supervision over religious or eleemosynary bodies of all faiths in Palestine as may be required for the maintenance of public order and good government. Subject to such supervision, no measures shall be taken in Palestine to obstruct or interfere with the enterprise of such bodies or to discriminate against any representative or member of them on the ground of his religion or nationality.

Article 17. The administration of Palestine may organize on a voluntary basis the forces necessary for the preservation of peace and order, and also for the defense of the country, subject, however, to the supervision of the Mandatory, but shall not use them for purposes other than those above specified save with the consent of the Mandatory. Except for such purposes, no military, naval or air forces shall be raised or maintained by the administration of Palestine.

Nothing in this article shall preclude the administration of Palestine from contributing to the cost of the maintenance of the forces of the Mandatory in Palestine.

The Mandatory shall be entitled at all times to use the roads, railways and ports of Palestine for the movement of armed forces and the carriage of fuel and supplies.

Article 18. The Mandatory shall see that there is no discrimination in Palestine against the national of any state member of the League of Nations (including companies incorporated under its laws) as compared with those of the Mandatory or of any foreign state in matters concerning taxation, commerce or navigation, the exercise of industries or professions, or in the treatment of merchant vessels or civil aircraft. Similarly, there shall be no discrimination in Palestine against goods originating in or destined for any of the said states, and there shall be freedom of transit under equitable conditions across the mandated area.

Subject as aforesaid and to the other provisions of this mandate, the administration of Palestine may, on the advice of the Mandatory, impose such taxes and customs duties as it may consider necessary, and take such steps as it may think best to promote the development of the natural resources of the country and to safeguard the interests of the population. It may also, on the advice of the Mandatory, conclude a special customs agreement with any state the

territory of which in 1914 was wholly included in Asiatic Turkey or Arabia.

Article 19. The Mandatory shall adhere on behalf of the administration of Palestine to any general international conventions already existing, or which may be concluded hereafter with the approval of the League of Nations, respecting the slave traffic, the traffic in arms and ammunition, or the traffic in drugs, or relating to commercial equality, freedom of transit and navigation, aerial navigation and postal, telegraphic and wireless communication or literary, artistic or industrial property.

Article 20. The Mandatory shall co-operate on behalf of the administration of Palestine, so far as religious, social and other conditions may permit, in the execution of any common policy adopted by the League of Nations for preventing and combating disease, including diseases of plants and animals.

Article 21. The Mandatory shall secure the enactment within twelve months from this date, and shall ensure the execution of a law of antiquities based on the following rules. This law shall ensure equality of treatment in the matter of excavations and archaeological research to the nationals of all states members of the League of Nations.

(1) "Antiquity" means any construction or any product of human activity earlier than the year 1700 A.D.

(2) The law for the protection of antiquities shall

proceed by encouragement rather than by threat.

Any person who, having discovered an antiquity without being furnished with the authorization referred to in paragraph 5, reports the same to an official of the competent department, shall be rewarded according to the value of the discovery.

(3) No antiquity may be disposed of except to the competent department, unless this department renounces the acquisition of any such antiquity.

No antiquity may leave the country without an export license from the said department.

(4) Any person who maliciously or negligently destroys or damages an antiquity shall be liable to a penalty to be fixed.

(5) No clearing of ground or digging with the object of finding antiquities shall be permitted, under penalty of fine, except to persons authorized by the competent department.

(6) Equitable terms shall be fixed for expropriation, temporary or permanent of lands which might be of historical or archaeological interest.

(7) Authorization to excavate shall only be granted to persons who show sufficient guarantees of archaeological experiences. The administration of Palestine shall not, in granting these authorizations, act in such a way as to exclude scholars of any nation without good grounds.

(8) The proceeds of excavations may be divided between the excavator and the competent department in a proportion fixed by that department. If division seems possible for scientific reasons, the excavator shall receive a fair indemnity in lieu of a part of the find.

Article 22. English, Arabic and Hebrew shall be the official languages of Palestine. Any statement or inscription in Arabic on stamps or money in Palestine shall be repeated in Hebrew and any statement or inscription in Hebrew shall be repeated in Arabic.

Article 23. The administration of Palestine shall recognize the holy days of the respective communities in Palestine as legal days of rest for the members of such communities.

Article 24. The Mandatory shall make to the Council of the League of Nations an annual report to the satisfaction of the Council as to the measures taken during the year to carry out the provisions of the mandate. Copies of all laws and regulations promulgated or issued during the year shall be communicated with the report.

Article 25. In the territories lying between the Jordan and the eastern boundary of Palestine as ultimately determined, the Mandatory shall be entitled, with the consent of the League of Nations, to postpone or withhold application of such provisions of this mandate as he may consider inapplicable to the existing local conditions, and to make

such provision for the administration of the territories as he may consider suitable to those conditions, provided that no action shall be taken which is inconsistent with the provisions of Articles 15, 16 and 18.

Article 26. The Mandatory agrees, if any dispute whatever should arise between the Mandatory and another Member of the League of Nations relating to the interpretations or the application of the provisions of the mandate, such dispute, if it cannot be settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice provided for by Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

Article 27. The consent of the Council of the League of Nations is required for any modification of the terms of this mandate.

Article 28. In the event of the termination of the mandate hereby conferred upon the Mandatory, the Council of the League of Nations shall make such arrangements as may be deemed necessary for safeguarding in perpetuity, under guarantee of the League, the right secured by Articles 13 and 14, and shall use its influence for securing, under the guarantee of the League, that the Government of Palestine will fully honor the financial obligations legitimately, incurred by the administration of Palestine during the period of the mandate, including the rights of public servants to pensions or gratuities.

The present instrument shall be deposited in original in

the archives of the League of Nations and certified copies shall be forwarded by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations to all members of the League.

Done at London the twenty-fourth day of July, one thousand nine hundred and twenty-two.

APPENDIX 3

I. The following letter from the United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations had been received by the Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations:

United Kingdom Delegation
to the United
Nations, New York.

2nd April, 1947.

I have received the following message from my government:

"His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to place the question of Palestine on the Agenda of the General Assembly at its next regular Annual Session. They will submit to the Assembly an account of their administration of the League of Nations Mandate and will ask the Assembly to make recommendations, under Article 10 of the Charter, concerning the future government of Palestine.

In making this request, His Majesty's Government draw the attention of the Secretary-General to the desirability of an early settlement in Palestine and to the risk that the General Assembly might not be able to decide upon its recommendations at its next regular Annual Session unless some preliminary study of the question had previously been made under the auspices of the United Nations. They therefore request the Secretary-General to summon, as soon as possible, a special Session of the General Assembly for the purpose of constituting and instructing a Special Committee to prepare

for the consideration, at the regular Session of the Assembly, of the question referred to in the preceding paragraph."

(Signed) Alexander Cadogan.

II. Request from the Egyptian Government for the Inclusion of an Additional Item in the Agenda of the First Special Session of the General Assembly.

The following telegram has been received by the Secretary-General of the United Nations:

Washington, D.C.,
21st April, 1947.

SIR I HAVE THE HONOUR TO ADVISE THAT ACCORDING TO INSTRUCTION RECEIVED FROM MY GOVERNMENT AND ITS COMFORMITY OF ARTICLE 18 OF THE PROVISIONAL RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY THE ROYAL EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT REQUESTS TO INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL ITEM ON THE AGENDA OF THE FORTHCOMING EXTRAORDINARY MEETING OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY WHICH IS TO DEAL WITH THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE ON THE 28th OF APRIL 1947. THE ITEM READS AS FOLLOWS: THE TERMINATION OF THE MANDATE OVER PALESTINE AND THE DECLARATION OF ITS INDEPENDENCE. ACCEPT SIR THE ASSURANCES OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION ** MAHMOUD HASSAN, EGYPTIAN AMBASSADOR

III. Request from the Iraqi Government for the Inclusion of an Additional Item in the Agenda of the First Special Session

of the General Assembly.

The following letter has been received by the Secretary-General of the United Nations:

Embassy of Iraq,
Washington, D.C.
21st April, 1947.

I have the honour to inform you that I have been instructed by my Government to request you, in accordance with Rule 18 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure for the General Assembly, to include the following as an additional item in the Agenda of the Special Session of the General Assembly convening on April 28, 1947:

The Termination of the Mandate over Palestine
and the Declaration of its Independence.

(Signed) Ali Jawdat,
Ambassador.

IV. Request from the Syrian Government for the Inclusion of an Additional item in the Agenda of the First Special Session of the General Assembly.

The following telegram has been received by the Secretary-General of the United Nations:

Washington, D.C., 22nd April, 1947

I HAVE THE HONOUR TO INFORM YOU THAT I HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED BY MY GOVERNMENT TO REQUEST YOU, IN ACCORDANCE WITH RULE 18 OF THE PROVISIONAL RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, TO INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING AS ADDITIONAL ITEM IN THE AGENDA OF THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY CONVENING APRIL 28, 1947: THE TERMINATION OF THE MANDATE OVER PALESTINE AND THE DECLARATION OF ITS INDEPENDENCE. PLEASE ACCEPT EXCELL-
ANCY THE RENEWED ASSURANCES OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION--
COSTI K. ZURAYK, MINISTER OF SYRIA.

V. Request from the Lebanese Government for the Inclusion

of an Additional Item in the Agenda of the First Special Session of the General Assembly.

The following telegram has been received by the Secretary-General of the United Nations:

Washington, D.C.
22nd April, 1947.

EXCELLENCY I HAVE THE HONOUR TO STATE THAT I AM INSTRUCTED BY MY GOVERNMENT TO REQUEST IN ACCORDANCE WITH RULE EIGHTEEN OF THE PROVISIONAL RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR THE PROCEDURE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY THE INCLUSION OF THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL ITEM IN THE AGENDA OF THE FORTHCOMING SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY SCHEDULED TO OPEN ON APRIL 28, 1947 "THE TERMINATION OF THE MANDATE ON AND THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO PALESTINE" ACCEPT EXCELLENCY THE RENEWED ASSURANCES OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION. CHARLES MALIK, MINISTER OF LEBANON IN THE UNITED STATES.

VI. Request by the Saudi Arabian Government for the Inclusion of an Additional Item in the Agenda of the First Special Session of the General Assembly

The following letter has been received from the Secretary-general of the United Nations:

Royal Legation of Saudi Arabia,
Washington, D.C.
22nd April, 1947.

I have been instructed by my Government to request, in accordance with Rule 18 Provisional Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly, that the following item be put on the Agenda of the Special Session which convenes on April 28th, 1947:

"The termination of the mandate over Palestine and the declaration of its independence."

(Signed) ASAD AL-FAQIH,
Minister.

APPENDIX 4

PROVISIONAL RULES OF PROCEDURE OF
THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PALESTINE

I. CHAIRMAN, VICE-CHAIRMAN, AND RAPPORTEUR

Rule 1. The special Committee shall elect its own Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Rapporteur, or Rapporteurs.

Rule 2. If the Chairman is unable to perform his function, a new Chairman shall be elected for the unexpired term.

Rule 3. The Vice-Chairman acting as Chairman shall have the same powers and duties as the Chairman.

Rule 4. In addition to exercising the powers which are conferred upon him elsewhere by these Rules, the Chairman shall declare the opening and closing of each meeting, shall direct the discussions, ensure observance of these Rules, accord the right to speak, put questions to the vote and announce the decisions. He shall rule on points of order, and subject to these Rules, shall have complete control of the proceedings at any meeting.

II. LANGUAGES

Rule 5. The Committee will conduct its work in both English and French except when it may agree that the interpretation may be dispensed with.

Rule 6. Witnesses who are unable to employ any of the

official languages of the United Nations shall as a rule provide their own interpreters. If a witness who appears at the instance of the Committee is unable to employ any of the official languages and to provide his own interpreter, the Secretariat shall arrange for the same.

III. RECORDS

Rule 7. As a general rule only summary records of its public and private meetings shall be drawn up unless the necessity for verbatim records in respect of a specific meeting or part of a meeting is recognized by the Committee.

Rule 8. Verbatim records will be taken of all hearing and made available to the members of the Committee. The Committee will decide in each case whether the testimony and discussion will be circulated verbatim or in summary form for the whole or part of the meeting.

IV. PUBLICITY OF MEETINGS, PRESS COMMUNIQUES AND VERBAL BRIEFINGS

Rule 9. The meetings of the Committee shall be held in public unless the Committee decides otherwise.

Rule 10. Meetings of sub-committees shall be held in public unless the sub-committee concerned decides otherwise.

Rule 11. Official press communiques shall be previously approved by the Chairman of the Committee. Press releases and verbal briefings may be issued by the press officer unless instructions to the contrary are given by the

Committee.

V. Conduct of Business

Rule 12. A majority of the Members of the Special Committee shall constitute a quorum.

Rule 13. No representative may address the Special Committee without having previously obtained the permission of the Chairman. The Chairman shall call upon speakers in the order in which they signify their desire to speak. The Chairman may call a speaker to order if his remarks are not relevant to the subject under discussion.

Rule 14. The chairman and the Rapporteur of the sub-committee may be accorded precedence for the purpose of explaining the conclusion arrived at by their sub-committee.

Rule 15. During the discussion of any matter, a representative may rise to a point of order and the point of order shall be immediately decided by the chairman in accordance with the Rules of Procedure. A representative may appeal against the ruling of the Chairman. The appeal shall immediately be put to the vote, and the Chairman's ruling shall stand unless overruled by a majority of the members present and voting.

Rule 16. During the discussion of any matter, a representative may move the adjournment of the debate. Any such motion shall have priority in the debate. In addition to the proposer of the motion, two representatives may speak

in favour of, and two against, the motion.

Rule 17. The Special Committee may limit the allowed to each speaker.

Rule 18. A representative may at any time move the closure of the debate whether or not any other representative has signified his wish to speak. If application is made for permission to speak against the closure it may be accorded to not more than two speakers.

Rule 19. The Chairman shall take the sense of the Special Committee on a motion for closure. If the Special Committee is in favour of the closure the Chairman shall declare the closure of the debate.

Rule 20. Resolutions, amendments, and substantive motions shall be introduced in writing and handed to the Principal Secretary who shall circulate copies to the representatives. As a general rule, no proposal shall be discussed or put to the vote at any meeting of the Special Committee unless copies of it have been circulated to all representatives not later than the day preceding consideration of amendments. or of motions as to procedure, without previous circulation of copies.

Rule 21. Parts of a proposal may be voted on separately if a representative requests that the proposal be divided.

Rule 22. If two or more amendments are moved to a

proposal, the Special Committee shall first vote on the amendment furthest removed in substance from the original proposal and then on the amendment next furthest removed, and so on, until all the amendments have been put to the vote.

Rule 23. When an amendment revised, adds to or deletes from a proposal, the amendment shall be voted on first, and if it is adopted, the amended proposal shall then be voted on.

VI. VOTING

Rule 24. Each Member of the Special Committee shall have one vote.

Rule 25. Decisions of the Special Committee shall be taken by a majority of the members present and voting. Abstentions shall not be counted as votes.

Rule 26. The Special Committee shall normally vote by show of hands, but any representative may request a roll-call which shall then be taken in the English alphabetical order of the names of the Members.

Rule 27. The vote of each Member participating in any roll-call shall be inserted in the record.

Rule 28. If a vote is equally divided on matters other than elections, a second vote shall be taken at the next meeting; this meeting shall be held within forty-eight hours of the first vote, and it shall be expressly mentioned in the

agenda that a second vote will be taken on the matter in question. If this vote also results in equality, the proposal shall be regarded as rejected.

VII. SUB-COMMITTEES AND SECRETARIAT

Rule 29. The Special Committee may set up sub-committees.

Rule 30. The Secretary-General or a member of the Secretariat designated by him may make to the Special Committee or any sub-committee any oral or written statement which the Secretary-General considers desirable.

VIII. LIAISON OFFICERS

Rule 31. The Mandatory Power, the Arab Higher Committee, and the Jewish Agency for Palestine may appoint liaison officers to the Committee who shall supply such information or render such other assistance as the Committee may require. The liaison officers may, suo motu, present at the direction of the Committee such information as they may think advisable.

IX. ORAL AND WRITTEN TESTIMONY

Rule 32. The Committee may, at its descretion, invite representatives of Governments or organizations, or private individuals, to submit oral or written testimony on any relevant matter.

Rule 33. Requests for oral hearing shall contain an indication of the subject or subjects on which the witness

desires to testify.

Rule 34. The Committee may refer to a sub-committee for examination and recommendation such requests to present oral testimony as it deems advisable.

Rule 35. The Committee shall in each case decide the time and place of the hearing of any witness from whom it may decide to receive oral testimony, The Committee may decide to advise any to submit his testimony in writing.

Rule 36. The Committee, on the basis of the time available to it, may limit either the number of witnesses or the time to be allowed to any witness.

Rule 37. The Committee may refer to a sub-committee for study and report such written testimony as it may deem advisable.

X. AMENDMENTS AND SUSPENSIONS

Rule 38. These rules of procedure may be amended or suspended by a decision of the Special Committee taken by a majority of the members present and voting.

APPENDIX 5

I. GROWTH OF POPULATION IN PALESTINE. (1)

	<u>Moslems</u>	<u>Jews</u>	<u>Christians</u>	<u>Others</u>	<u>Total</u>
1919	515,000	65,000	63,000	5,000	648,000
1922	589,177	83,790	71,464	7,617	752,048
1931	761,922	175,138	89,134	10,145	1,036,339
1935	836,688	355,157	105,236	11,031	1,308,112
1939	927,133	445,457	116,958	12,150	1,501,698
1941	973,104	474,102	125,413	12,881	1,585,500
1942	995,292	484,408	127,184	13,121	1,620,005
1943	1,028,715	502,912	131,281	13,663	1,676,571
1944	1,064,000	525,000	136,000	14,000	1,739,000
1946	1,076,783	608,225	145,063	15,488	1,845,559

II. RECORDED IMMIGRATION. (2)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Jews</u>	<u>Non-Jews</u>
1920	5,716	5,514	202
1921	9,339	9,149	190
1922	8,128	7,844	284
1923	7,991	7,421	570
1924	13,553	12,856	697
1925	34,641	33,801	840
1926	13,910	13,081	829
1927	3,595	2,713	882
1928	3,086	2,178	908
1929	6,566	5,249	1,317
1930	6,433	4,944	1,489
1931	5,533	4,075	1,458
1932	11,289	9,553	1,736
1933	31,977	30,327	1,650
1934	44,143	42,359	1,784
1935	64,174	61,854	2,293
1936	31,671	29,727	1,944
1937	12,475	10,536	1,939
1938	15,263	12,868	2,395
1939	18,433	16,405	2,028
1940	5,611	4,547	1,064
1941	4,270	3,647	623
1942	3,052	2,194	858

(1) Statistical Abstract, 1943, pp. 2 and iii.(2) Statistical Abstract, 1943, p. 12.

III. BETWEEN 1919 AND THE END OF 1937 THERE WERE 313,030 JEWISH IMMIGRANTS, OF THE FOLLOWING NATIONALITIES: (3)

<u>Nationality</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Poland	131,249	42
Germany	35,346	11
U.S.S.R.	30,718	10
Rumania	15,528	5
Lithuania	9,642	5
Yemen	9,181	3
U.S.A.	7,909	3
Others	73,457	23
	<u>313,030</u>	<u>100</u>

IV. THE RATE OF NATURAL INCREASE PER 1,000 PERSONS IN PALESTINE IS SHOWN ON THE FOLLOWING TABLE. (4)

<u>Years</u>	<u>Moslems</u>	<u>Jews</u>	<u>Christians</u>
1922-25	23.27	20.44	20.16
1926-30	25.19	22.70	20.60
1931-35	24.97	20.91	20.85
1936-40	27.68	17.75	20.77
1941-44	30.71	17.83	18.89

V. A COMPARISON OF THE PALESTINIAN RATE OF NATURAL INCREASE PER 1,000 WITH OTHER COUNTRIES FOR SELECT YEARS FOLLOWS: (5)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Palestine</u>	<u>U.S.</u>	<u>South Africa</u>	<u>India</u>
1921-25	22.6	10.7	17.4	6.7
1935-39	25.4	6.1	14.9	11.4

VI. COUNTRIES OF RECEPTION FOR JEWISH REFUGEES (1933-43). (6)

<u>Country</u>	<u>No. Admitted</u> (in thousands)	<u>Percent</u>
All countries.....	811	100.0
United States.....	190	23.5

(3) Royal Institute of International Affairs, Great Britain and Palestine, 1915-1945, London, 1946, p.66.

(4) Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, Report, Washington, 1946, p. 24.

(5) Robert R. Nathan, et. al., Palestine: Problem and Promise, Washington, 1946, p. 132.

(6) The Library of Congress, The Palestine Problem, Washington, D.C., March 1, 1947. p. 98.

<u>Country</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Palestine.....	120	14.8
England.....	65	8.1
France.....	55	6.8
Belgium.....	30	3.7
Holland.....	35	4.3
Switzerland.....	16	1.9
Spain.....	12	1.4
Other European Countries.....	70	8.8
Argentina.....	50	6.2
Brazil.....	25	3.1
Uruguay.....	7	0.8
Bolivia.....	12	1.4
Chile.....	14	1.7
Other Latin American countries.....	20	2.4
China.....	25	3.1
South Africa.....	8	1.0
Australia.....	9	1.1
Canada.....	8	1.0
Other countries.....	40	4.9

APPENDIX 6

SECRET TREATY
PARTITIONING ASIATIC TURKEY

[This Sykes-Picot Agreement of May 16, 1916, was disclosed by memoranda published in 1917 by the Bolshevists, who repudiated it. It represented a compromise of interests between the British support of the Arab nationalist movement and French imperialist ambitions in Syria.]

Memorandum dated March 6, 1917.

As a result of negotiations which took place in London and Petrograd in the Spring of 1916, the Allied British, French and Russian Governments came to an agreement as regards the future delimitation of their respective zones of influence and territorial acquisitions in Asiatic Turkey, as well as the formation in Arabia of an independent Arab State, or a federation of Arab States. The general principles of the agreement are as follows:

1. Russia obtains the provinces of Erzerum, Trebizond, Van, Bitlis, as well as territory in the southern part of Kurdistan, along the line Mush-Sert-Ibn-Omar-Amadjie-Persian frontier. The limit of Russian acquisitions on the Black Sea coast will be fixed later on at a point lying west of Trebizond.

2. France obtains the coastal strip of Syria, the vilayet of Adana, and a territory bounded on the south by a line

Aintab-Mardin to the future Russian frontier, and on the north by a line Ala-Dagh-Zara-Egin-Kharput.

3. Great Britain obtains the southern part of Mesopotamia with Bagdad, and stipulates for herself in Syria the ports of Haifa and Akka.

4. By agreement between France and England, the zone between the French and the British territories forms a confederation of Arab States, or one independent Arab State, the zones of influence in which are determined at the same time.

5. Alexandretta is proclaimed a free port.


With a view to securing the religious interests of the Entente Powers, Palestine, with the Holy places, is separated from Turkish territory and subjected to a special regime to be determined by agreement between Russia, France and England.

As a general rule the contracting Powers undertake mutually to recognise the concessions and privileges existing in the territories now acquired by them which have existed before the war.

They agree to assume such portions of the Ottoman Debt such as correspond to their respective acquisitions.*"

* See W. Henry Cooke & Edith P. Stickney, Reading in European International Relations Since 1879. (New York) Harpers & Brothers, 1931) P. 527. Taken from the Manchester Guardian, Jan. 19, 1981


THE TOURS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF ENQUIRY



Route traversed

Railways

Revivim
'Asluj












International frontier


PALESTINE PLAN ON PARTITION WITH ECONOMIC UNION


SKETCH MAP

(MAJORITY PROPOSAL.
Reference: Chapter VI, Part II)


 Arab State
 Jewish State

International Boundaries 
District Boundaries 
Sub-District Boundaries 
Roads  FIRST  SECOND  OTHER
Railways 





MAP NO. 82 UNITED NATIONS
 UN PRESENTATION 520
 SEPTEMBER 1947




BASE MAP: Survey of Palestine, April 1946.
 Modified.


PALESTINE FEDERAL STATE PLAN


SKETCH MAP

(MINORITY PROPOSAL.
Reference: Chapter VII)


 Arab State
 Jewish State

International Boundaries+ + + + +
District Boundaries
Sub-District Boundaries
Roads FIRST SECOND OTHER
Railways





MAP NO. 84 UNITED NATIONS
 UN PRESENTATION 522
 SEPTEMBER 1947




BASE MAP: Survey of Palestine, April 1946.

Modified.


PROVINCIAL AUTONOMY PLAN


Land in Jewish Possession
(as at 31-12-44)



In full or by concession

Share in undivided land





RESEARCH DEPT. F.O. July, 1946